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There has been an ongoing cycle between stronger attacks and stronger defenses in the
adversarial machine learning game. However, most of the existing defenses are subsequently
broken by a more advanced defense-aware attack. This dissertation first introduces a stronger
detection mechanism based on Capsule networks which achieves state-of-the-art detection
performance on both standard and defense-aware attacks. Then, we diagnose the adversarial
examples against our CapsNet and find that the success of the adversarial attack is proportional
to the visual similarity between the source and target class (which is not the case for CNN-based
networks). Pushing this idea further, we show how it is possible to pressure the attacker to
produce an input that visually resembles the attacks target class, thereby deflecting the attack.
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These deflected attack images thus can no longer be called adversarial, as our network classifies
them the same way as humans do. The existence of the deflected adversarial attacks also indicates
the `p norm is not sufficient to ensure the same semantic class. Finally, this dissertation discusses
how to design adversarial attacks for speech recognition systems based on human perception
rather than the `p-norm metric.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that are specifically designed
by an adversary to cause an incorrect output [63, 21]. Initial work on adversarial examples
focused mainly on the domain of image classification, where adversarial examples can be
constructed by imperceptibly modifying images to cause misclassification, and are practical
in the physical world [33]. Since the discovery of the existence of the adversarial examples,
some research work focused on either the creation of more robust models to defend against
adversarial attacks [61, 41, 71], or designing a robust detection mechanism to detect adversarial
attacks [22, 16, 43, 37, 50, 52]. Specifically, to defend against adversarial attacks is to correctly
classified the adversarial input as the original class rather than the adversarial target class.
Instead, the detection algorithms aim to distinguish adversarial attacks from real data and then
flag the adversarial input. However, better defenses have led to the develpment of stronger attack
algorithms to break these defenses [41, 10]. After several iterations of creating and breaking
defenses, many state-of-the-art defenses and detection methods [52, 40, 37, 26] were broken
subsequently with a more advanced defense-aware attack [25, 9, 2].
To end this ongoing cycle between stronger attacks and stronger defenses in the adversar-
ial machine learning game, we first propose to detect adversarial examples or otherwise corrupted
out-of-distribution images based on a class-conditional reconstruction of the input in Chapter
2. Then, to attack our own detection mechanism, we propose the Reconstructive Attack, which
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seeks both to cause a misclassification and a low reconstruction error. This reconstructive attack
produces undetected adversarial examples but with much smaller success rate compared to the
standard attacks. Among all these attacks, we find that Capsule networks (CapsNets) always
perform better than convolutional networks.
Since adversarial examples raise questions about whether neural network models are
sensitive to the same visual features as humans, we then diagnose the adversarial examples for
CapsNets in Chapter 3 and find that the success of the reconstructive attack was proportional to
the visual similarity between the source and target class. Additionally, the resulting perturbations
can cause the input image to appear visually more like the target class and hence become
nonadversarial. This is not the case for the CNN-based models. These extensive qualitative
studies suggest that CapsNets use features that are more aligned with human perception and
might have the potential to address the central issue raised by adversarial examples.
In Chapter 4, we present a new direction in defenses, which we argue is a step towards
ending this cycle by deflecting adversarial attacks, i.e. by forcing the attacker to produce an input
which visually resembles the adversarial target class. As we know for gradient-based attacks,
the attackers are following the gradient with regard to the input to construct the adversarial
example. Our deflecting model based on Capsule networks is able to force the attacker to
follow the gradients pointing towards changing the perceptual class rather than an imperceptible
adversarial noise. To this end, we first propose a stronger defense mechanism which combines
three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-the-art detection performance on both standard
and defense-aware attacks. We then show that undetected attacks against our deflecting model
are often classified as the adversarial target class by performing a human study where participants
are asked to label the class of images produced by the attack. These attack images thus can no
longer be called adversarial, as our network classifies them the same way as humans do.
In order to differentiate properties of adversarial examples on neural networks in general
from properties which hold true only on images, it is important to study adversarial examples
in different domains. So far, adversarial examples are known to exist on various domains,
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including image classification [5], speech recognition [11], reinforcement learning [26] and
reading comprehension [29]. In Chapter 5, we focus on studying the adversarial example in
the audio domain where Carlini and Wagner’s work [11] showed that any given source audio
sample can be perturbed slightly to attack an automatic speech recognition system into making
a targeted transcription. In contrast to the adversarial examples in the image domain, current
targeted adversarial examples applied to speech recognition systems are neither imperceptible
nor practical in the real world: humans can easily identify the adversarial perturbations, and
they are not effective when played over-the-air. In Chapter 5, we make advances on both of
these fronts. First, we develop effectively imperceptible audio adversarial examples (verified
through a human study) by leveraging the psychoacoustic principle of auditory masking, while
retaining 100% targeted success rate on arbitrary full-sentence targets. Next, we make progress
towards physical-world over-the-air audio adversarial examples by constructing perturbations
which remain effective even after applying realistic simulated environmental distortions.
In Chapter 6, we summarize the contributions of this thesis and discuss the promising
future work related to adversarial examples in order to increase the security of AI systems and to
help us understand deep neural networks.
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Chapter 2
Detecting Adversarial Attacks
2.1 Introduction
Adversarial examples [64] are inputs that are designed by an adversary to cause a
machine learning system to make a misclassification. A series of studies on adversarial attacks
has shown that it is easy to cause misclassifications using visually imperceptible changes to an
image under `p-norm based similarity metrics [21, 34, 41, 10]. Since the discovery of adversarial
examples, there has been a constant “arms race” between better attacks and better defenses. Many
new defenses have been proposed [61, 20, 22, 43], only to be broken shortly thereafter [9, 2].
Currently, the most effective approach to reduce network’s vulnerability to adversarial examples
is “adversarial training”, in which a network is trained on both clean images and adversarially
perturbed ones [21, 41]. However, adversarial training is very time-consuming because it requires
generating adversarial examples during training. It also typically only helps improve a network’s
robustness to adversarial examples that are generated in a similar way to those on which the
network was trained. [24] showed that capsule models are more robust to simple adversarial
attacks than CNNs but [44] showed that this is not the case for all attacks.
The cycle of attacks and defenses motivates us to rethink both how we can improve
the general robustness of neural networks as well as the high-level motivation for this pursuit.
One potential path forward is to detect adversarial inputs, instead of attempting to accurately
classify them [58, 52]. Recent works [28, 18] argue that adversarial examples can exist within
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.1. (a) The histogram of `2 distances between the input and the reconstruction using
the correct capsule or other capsules in CapsNet on the real MNIST images. Notice the stark
difference between the distributions of reconstructions of the capsule corresponding to the correct
class and other capsules. (b) The histograms of `2 distances between the reconstruction and the
input for real and adversarial images for the three models explored in this chapter on the MNIST
dataset. We use PGD [41] with the `∞ bound ε = 0.3 to create the attacks.
the data distribution, which implies that detecting adversarial examples based on an estimate of
the data distribution alone might be insufficient. Instead, in this chapter we develop methods
for detecting adversarial examples by making use of class-conditional reconstruction networks.
These sub-networks, first proposed by [54] as part of a Capsule Network (CapsNet), allow a
model to produce a reconstruction of its input based on the identity and instantiation parameters
of the winning capsule. Interestingly, we find that reconstructing an input from the capsule
corresponding to the correct class results in a much lower reconstruction error than reconstructing
the input from capsules corresponding to incorrect classes, as shown in Figure 2.1(a). Motivated
by this, we propose using the reconstruction sub-network in a CapsNet as an attack-independent
detection mechanism. Specifically, we reconstruct a given input from the resulting capsule
pose parameters of the winning capsule and then detect adversarial examples by comparing
the difference between the reconstruction distributions for natural and adversarial (or otherwise
corrupted) images.
We extend this detection mechanism to standard convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
and show its effectiveness against black box and white box attacks on three image datasets;
MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN. We show that capsule models achieve the strongest attack
detection rates and accuracy on these attacks. We then test our method against a stronger attack,
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the Reconstructive Attack, specifically designed to attack our detection mechanism by generating
adversarial examples with a small reconstruction error. With this attack we are able to create
undetected adversarial examples, but we show that this attack is less successful in fooling the
classifier than a non-reconstructive attack.
In this chapter, we mainly focus on:
• proposing a class-conditional capsule reconstruction based detection method to detect
standard white-box/black-box adversarial examples on multiple datasets. This detection
mechanism is attack-agnostic and is successfully extended to standard convolutional neural
networks.
• testing our detection mechanism on the corrupted MNIST dataset and show that it can
work as a general out-of-distribution detector.
• designing the reconstructive attack, which is specifically designed to attack our detection
mechanism but becomes less successful in fooling the classifier.
2.2 Related Work
Adversarial examples were first introduced in [5, 64], where a given image was modified
by following the gradient of a classifier’s output with respect to the image’s pixels. [21] then
developed the more efficient Fast Gradient Sign method (FGSM), which can change the label of
the input image X with a similarly imperceptible perturbation which is constructed by taking an
ε step in the direction of the gradient. Later, the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [34] and Project
Gradient Descent [41] can generate stronger attacks improved on FGSM by taking multiple steps
in the direction of the gradient. In addition, [10] proposed another iterative optimization-based
method to construct strong adversarial examples with small perturbations.
An early approach to reducing vulnerability to adversarial examples was proposed by
[21], where a network was trained on both clean images and adversarially perturbed ones. Since
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then, there has been a constant “arms race” between better attacks and better defenses; [35]
provide an overview of this field. However, many defenses against adversarial examples have
been demonstrated to be an effect of “obfuscated gradients” and can be further circumvented
under the white-box setting [2].
A recent thread of research focuses on the generation of (and defense against) adversarial
examples which are not simply slightly-perturbed versions of clean images. For example, several
approaches were proposed which utilize generative models to create novel images which appear
realistic but which result in a misclassification [55, 27, 42]. These adversarial images are not
imperceptibly close to some existing image, but nevertheless resemble members of the data
distribution to humans and are strongly misclassified by neural networks. [53] also consider
adversarial examples which are not the result of pixel-space perturbations by manipulating the
hidden representation of a neural network in order to generate an adversarial example. Also
they show that adversaries exist for a network with random weights. Therefore, susceptibility to
adversarial attacks is not caused by learning and the convolution neural network architectures
are fragile.
Another line of work attempts to circumvent adversarial examples by detecting them
with a separately-trained classifier [20, 22, 43] or using statistical properties [23, 38, 16, 22].
However, many of these approaches were subsequently shown to be flawed [9, 2]. The most
recent work in detecting adversarial examples [52] that has 99% true positive rate in CIFAR10
dataset [32] has also been fully bypassed by later work [25] which decreased the true positive
rate to less than 2%.
Similar to our work, [58] also investigated the effectiveness of a class-conditional genera-
tive model as a defense mechanism for MNIST digits. However, we differ in some important
ways. Their model is in some ways the opposite of ours - they first attempt to generate the input,
and then make a classification on the resultant generations, whereas our method attempts to first
classify the input, making use of an otherwise unchanged capsule classification model, and then
generates the input from a high level representation. As such our method does not increase the
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computational overhead of classifying the input, compared to the approach of [58], which results
in a 10x increase in computation. In addition, the work of [58] is only applied to MNIST, so our
results on the more complex datasets represent an improvement.
2.3 Preliminaries
2.3.1 Adversarial Examples
Given a clean test image x, its corresponding label y, and a classifier f (·) which predicts a
class label given an input, we refer to x′ = x+δ as an adversarial example if it is able to fool the
classifier into making a wrong prediction f (x′) 6= f (x) = y. The small adversarial perturbation
δ (where “small” is measured under some norm) causes the adversarial example x′ to appear
visually similar to the clean image x but to be classified differently. In the unrestricted case
where we only require that f (x′) 6= y, we refer to x′ as an “untargeted adversarial example”. A
more powerful attack is to generate a “targeted adversarial example”: instead of simply fooling
the classifier to make a wrong prediction, we force the classifier to predict some targeted label
f (x′) = t 6= y. In this chapter, the target label t is selected uniformly at random as any label
which is not the ground-truth correct label. As is standard practice in the literature, we test our
detection mechanism on three `∞ norm based attacks (fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [21],
the basic iterative method (BIM) [34], projected gradient descent (PGD) [41]) and one `2 norm
based attack (Carlini-Wagner (CW) [10]).
2.3.2 Capsule Networks
Capsule Networks (CapsNets) are an alternative architecture for neural networks [54, 24].
In this work we make use of the CapsNet architecture detailed by [54]. Unlike a standard neural
network which is made up of layers of scalar-valued units, CapsNets are made up of layers of
capsules, which output a vector or matrix. Intuitively, just as one can think of the activation of
a unit in a normal neural network as the presence of a feature in the input, the activation of a
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capsule can be thought of as both the presence of a feature and the pose parameters that represent
attributes of that feature. A top-level capsule in a classification network therefore outputs both a
classification and pose parameters that represent the instance of that class in the input. This high
level representation allows us to train a reconstruction network.
2.3.3 Threat Model
In this chapter, we test our detection mechanism against both white-box and black-box
attacks. For white-box attacks, the adversary has full access to the model as well as its parameters.
In particular, the adversary is allowed to compute the gradient through the model to generate
adversarial examples. To perform black-box attacks, the adversary is allowed to know the
network architecture but not its parameters. Therefore, we retrain a substitute model that has
the same architecture as the target model and generate adversarial examples by attacking the
substitute model. Then we transfer these attacks to the target model. For `∞ based attacks, we
always control the `∞ norm of the adversarial perturbation to be within a relatively small bound
ε∞, specific to each dataset.
2.4 Detecting Adversarial Images by Reconstruction
2.4.1 Models
To detect adversarial images, we make use of the reconstruction network proposed
in [54], which takes pose parameters v as input and outputs the reconstructed image r(v). The
reconstruction network is simply a fully connected neural network with two ReLU hidden layers
with 512 and 1024 units respectively, with a sigmoid output with the same dimensionality as
the dataset. The reconstruction network is trained to minimize the `2 distance between the input
image and the reconstructed image. This same network architecture is used for all the models
and datasets we explore. The only difference is what is given to the reconstruction network as
input.
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• CapsNet
The reconstruction network of the CapsNet is class-conditional: It takes in the pose
parameters of all the class capsules and masks all values to 0 except for the pose parameters
of the predicted class. We use this reconstruction network for detecting adversarial
attacks by measuring the Euclidean distance between the input and a class conditional
reconstruction. Specifically, for any given input x, the CapsNet outputs a prediction f (x)
as well as the pose parameters v for all classes. The reconstruction network takes in
the pose parameters and then selects the pose parameter corresponding to the predicted
class, denoted as v f (x), to generate a reconstruction r(v f (x)). Then we compute the `2
reconstruction distance d(x) = ‖r(v f (x)),x‖2 between the reconstructed image and the
input image, and compare it with a pre-defined detection threshold p (described below in
Section 2.4.2). If the reconstruction distance d(x) is higher than the detection threshold p,
we flag the input as an adversarial example. Figure 2.1 (b) shows example histograms of
reconstruction distances for natural images and typical adversarial examples.
• CNN+CR
Although our strategy is inspired by the reconstruction networks used in CapsNets, the
strategy can be extended to standard convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We create
a similar architecture, CNN with conditional reconstruction (CNN+CR), by dividing the
penultimate hidden layer of a CNN into groups corresponding to each class. The sum of
each neuron group serves as the logit for that particular class and the group itself serves
the same purpose as the pose parameters in the CapsNet. We use the same masking
mechanism as [54] to select the pose parameter corresponding to the predicted label v f (x)
and generate the reconstruction based on the selected pose parameters. In this way we
extend the class-conditional reconstruction network to standard CNNs.
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• CNN+R
We can also create a more naı¨ve implementation of our strategy by simply computing the
reconstruction from the activations in the entire penultimate layer without any masking
mechanism. We call this model the ”CNN+R” model. In this way we are able to study the
effect of conditioning on the predicted class.
2.4.2 Detection Threshold
We find the threshold θ for detecting adversarial inputs by measuring the reconstruction
error between a validation input image and its reconstruction. If the distance between the input
and the reconstruction is above the chosen threshold θ , we classify the data as adversarial.
Choosing the detection threshold θ involves a trade-off between false positive and false negative
detection rates. The optimal threshold depends on the probability of the system being attacked.
Such a trade-off is discussed by [17]. In our experiments we don’t tune this parameter and simply
set it as the 95th percentile of validation distances. This means our false positive rate on real
validation data is 5%.
2.5 Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the evaluation metrics, test models and datasets that are
used to evaluate the performance of our models. Then, we explain the implementation details to
generate the adversarial attacks. Next, we demonstrate how reconstruction networks can detect
standard white-box and naturally corrupted images. In addition, we introduce the “reconstructive
attack”, which is specifically designed to circumvent our defense and show that it is a more
powerful attack in this setting. We also report the performance of our detection methods towards
black-box standard and reconstructive attacks. Finally, we show the detection performance on
the CIFAR-10 dataset and discuss the effectiveness of the class-conditional information in the
reconstruction network.
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2.5.1 Evaluation Metrics
We use Accuracy to represent the proportion of clean examples that are correctly classi-
fied. In addition, We use Success Rate to measure the success of attacks. For targeted attacks,
the success rate St is defined as the proportion of inputs which are classified as the target class,
St = 1N ∑
N
i ( f (x
′
i) = ti), while the success rate for untargeted attacks is defined as the proportion
of inputs which are misclassified, Su = 1N ∑
N
i ( f (x
′
i) 6= yi). Previous works [9, 25] used True
Positive Rate to measure the proportion of adversarial examples that are detected, which alone
is insufficient to measure the ability of different detection mechanism because the unsuccessful
adversarial examples do not have to be detected. Therefore, we propose to use Undetected Rate:
the proportion of attacks that are successful and undetected to evaluate the detection mechanism.
For targeted attacks, the undetected rate is defined as Rt = 1N ∑
N
i ( f (x
′
i) = ti)∩ (d(x′i)≤ θ), where
d(·) computes the reconstruction distance of the input and p denotes the detection threshold
introduced in section 2.4.2. Similarly, the undetected rate for untargeted attacks Ru can be defined
as Ru = 1N ∑
N
i ( f (x
′
i) 6= yi)∩ (d(x′i)≤ θ). The smaller the undetected rate Rt or Ru is, the stronger
the model is in detecting adversarial examples. The undetected rate can also be used to evaluate
the attacks (higher is better). We also plot the Undetected Rate vs. False Positive Rate curve
to compare the detection performance between different models, where False Positive Rate is
defined as the proportion of clean examples that are misclassified as the adversarial example by
the detection method.
2.5.2 Test Models and Datasets
In all experiments, all three models (CapsNet, CNN+R, and CNN+CR) have the same
number of parameters and were trained with Adam [31] for the same number of epochs. The
details of the model architectures on three datasets: MNIST [36], FashionMNIST [68], and
SVHN [47] are shown in Figure 2.2. MNIST and FashionMNIST have exactly the same
architectures while we use larger models for SVHN. Note that the only difference between
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Figure 2.2. The architecture for the CapsNet, CNN+R and CNN+CR model used for our
experiments on MNIST [36], FashionMNIST [68], and SVHN [47].
the CNN reconstruction (CNN+R) and the CNN conditional reconstruction (CNN+CR) is the
masking procedure on the input to the reconstruction network based on the predicted class.
We display the test error rate for each model on these three datasets in Table 2.1. In
general, all models achieved similar test accuracy. We did not do an exhaustive hyperparameter
search on these models, instead we chose hyperparameters that allowed each model to perform
roughly equivalently on the test sets.
2.5.3 Implementation Details
For all the `∞ based adversarial examples, the `∞ norm of the perturbations is bound
by ε , which is set to 0.3, 0.1, 0.1 for MNIST, Fashion MNIST and SVHN dataset respectively
following previous works [41, 61]. In FGSM based attacks, the step size c is 0.05. In BIM-based
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Table 2.1. The test accuracy of each model when the input are clean test images in each dataset.
Dataset CapsNet CNN+CR CNN+R
MNIST 99.4% 99.3% 99.4%
FashionMNIST 90.4% 90.5% 90.7%
SVHN 89.3% 90.7% 90.5%
[34] and PGD-based [41] attacks, the step size c is 0.01 for all the datasets and the number of
iterations are 1000, 500 and 200 for MNIST, Fashion MNIST and SVHN dataset respectively.
We choose a sufficiently large number of iterations to ensure the attacks has converged.
We use the publicly released code from the authors of [10] to perform the CW attack for
our models. The number of iterations are set to 1000 for all three datasets.
Table 2.2. Success rate and undetected rate of white-box targeted and untargeted attacks. In the
table, St/Rt is shown for targeted attacks and Su/Ru is presented for untargeted attacks.
Networks
Targeted (%) Untargeted (%)
FGSM BIM PGD CW FGSM BIM PGD CW
MNIST Dataset
CapsNet 3/0 82/0 86/0 99/2 11/0 99/0 99/0 100/19
CNN+CR 16/0 93/0 95/0 89/8 85/0 100/0 100/0 100/28
CNN+R 37/0 100/0 100/0 100/47 64/0 100/0 100/0 100/63
FASHION MNIST Dataset
CapsNet 7/5 54/9 55/10 100/26 35/29 86/50 87/51 100/68
CNN+CR 19/13 89/28 89/28 87/37 74/33 100/25 100/24 100/72
CNN+R 23/16 98/19 98/19 99/81 62/48 100/35 100/34 100/87
SVHN Dataset
CapsNet 22/20 83/45 84/46 100/90 74/67 99/70 99/68 100/94
CNN+CR 24/23 99/90 99/90 99/93 87/82 100/90 100/89 100/90
CNN+R 26/24 100/86 100/86 100/94 88/82 100/92 100/92 100/95
2.5.4 Standard White-box Attacks
We present the success and undetected rates for several targeted and untargeted attacks on
MNIST, FashionMNIST, and SVHN in Table 2.2. Our method is able to accurately detect many
14
Table 2.3. Error rate/undetected rate on the Corrupted MNIST dataset.
Corruption Clean GaussianNoise
Gaussian
Blur Line
Dotted
Line
Elastic
Transform
CapsNet 0.6/0.2 12.1/0.0 10.3/4.1 19.6/0.1 4.3/0.0 11.3/0.8
CNN+CR 0.7/0.3 9.8/0.0 6.7/4.2 17.6/0.1 4.2/0.0 11.1/1.1
CNN+R 0.6/0.4 6.7/0.0 8.9/6.4 18.9/0.1 3.1/0.0 12.2/2.1
Corruption Saturate JPEG Quantize Sheer Spatter Rotate
CapsNet 3.5/0.0 0.8/0.4 0.7/0.1 1.6/0.4 1.9/0.2 6.5/2.2
CNN+CR 1.5/0.0 0.8/0.5 0.9/0.1 2.1/0.4 1.8/0.4 6.1/1.6
CNN+R 1.2/0.0 0.7/0.5 0.7/0.2 2.2/0.7 1.8/0.4 6.5/3.4
Corruption Contrast Inverse Canny Edge Fog Frost Zigzag
CapsNet 92.0/0.0 91.0/0.0 21.5/0.0 83.7/0.0 70.6/0.0 16.9/0.0
CNN+CR 72.0/32.6 78.1/0.0 34.6/0.0 66.0/0.5 37.6/0.0 18.4/0.0
CNN+R 73.4/49.4 88.1/0.0 23.4/0.0 65.6/0.1 36.2/0.0 17.5/0.0
attacks with very low undetected rates. Capsule models almost always have the lowest undetected
rates out of our three models. It is worth noting that this method performs best with the simplest
dataset, MNIST, and that the highest undetected rates are found with the Carlini-Wagner attack
on the SVHN dataset. This illustrates both the strength of this attack and a shortcoming of our
defense, namely that our detection mechanism relies on `2 image distance as a proxy for visual
similarity, and in the case of higher dimensional color datasets such as SVHN, this proxy is less
meaningful.
2.5.5 Corruption Attacks
Recent work has argued that improving the robustness of neural networks to `p norm
bounded adversarial attacks should not come at the expense of increasing error rates under
distributional shifts that do not affect human classification rates and are likely to be encountered
in the “real-world” [17]. For example, if an image is corrupted due to adverse weather, lighting,
or occlusion, we might hope that our model can continue to provide reliable predictions or
detect the distributional shift. We can test our detection method on its ability to detect these
distributional shifts by making use of the Corrupted MNIST dataset [46]. This data set contains
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many visual transformations of MNIST that do not seem to affect human performance, but
nevertheless are strongly misclassified by state-of-the-art MNIST models. Our three models can
almost always detect these distributional shifts (in all corruptions CapsNets have either a small
undetected rate or an undetected rate of 0). The error rate (the proportion of misclassified input)
and undetected rate of three test models on the Corrupted MNIST dataset is shown in Table 2.3.
We also visualize the examples from Corrupted MNIST dataset [46] and the corresponding
reconstructed images for each model in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4.
2.5.6 Reconstructive Attacks
Thus far we have only evaluated previously-defined attacks. Following the suggestion
in [9] that detection methods need to show effectiveness towards defense-aware attacks, we
introduce an attack specifically designed to take into account our defense mechanism. In order to
construct adversarial examples that cannot be detected by the network, we propose a two-stage
optimization method to generate a “reconstructive attack”. Specifically, in each step, we first
attempt to fool the network by following a standard attack which computes the gradient of
the cross-entropy loss function with respect to the input. Then, in the second stage, we take
the reconstruction error into account by updating the adversarial perturbation based on the `2
reconstruction loss. In this way, we endeavor to construct adversarial examples that can fool the
network and also have a small `2 reconstruction error. The untargeted and targeted reconstructive
attacks based are described in more detail below.
Untargeted Reconstructive Attacks
To construct untargeted reconstructive attacks, we first update the perturbation based on
the gradient of the cross-entropy loss function following a standard FGSM attack [21], that is:
δ ← clipε(δ + c ·β · sign(∇δ `net( f (x+δ ),y))), (2.1)
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Figure 2.3. Examples of Corrupted MNIST and the reconstructed image for each model. A red
box represents that this input is flagged as an adversarial example while a green box represents
that this input has been misclassified and not been detected.
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Figure 2.4. Examples of Corrupted MNIST and the reconstructed image for each model
(continued). A red box represents that this input is flagged as an adversarial example while a
green box represents that this input has been misclassified and not been detected.
where `net( f (·),y) is the cross-entropy loss function, ε is the `∞ bound for our attacks, c is
a hyperparameter controlling the step size in each iteration and β is a hyperparameter which
balances the importance of the cross-entropy loss and the reconstruction loss (explained further
below). In the second stage, we focus on constraining the reconstructed image from the newly
predicted label to have a small reconstruction distance by updating δ according to
δ ← clipε(δ − c · (1−β ) · sign(∇δ (‖r(v f (x+δ ))− (x+δ )‖2))), (2.2)
where r(v f (x+δ )) is the class-conditional reconstruction based on the predicted label f (x+δ )
in a CapsNet or CNN+CR network. The δ used here is the optimized δ from the first stage.
‖r(v f (x+δ ))− (x+δ )‖2 is the `2 reconstruction distance between the reconstructed image and
the input image. Since the CNN+R network does not use the class conditional reconstruction,
we simply use the reconstructed image without the masking mechanism. According to Eqn 2.1
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and Eqn 2.2, we can see that β balances the importance between the success rate of attacks and
the reconstruction distance. This hyperparameter was tuned for each model and each dataset in
order to create the strongest attacks.
Targeted Reconstructive Attacks
We perform a similar two-stage optimization to construct targeted reconstructive attacks,
by defining a target label and attempting to maximize the classification probability of this label,
and minimize the reconstruction error from corresponding capsule. In the first stage, we use a
standard targeted attack to update the perturbation by computing the gradient of the cross-entropy
loss function. Specifically, in the first stage of each step, we update the adversarial perturbation
via:
δ ← clipε(δ − c ·β · sign(∇δ `net( f (x+δ ),y))). (2.3)
Then in the second stage, we focus on constraining the `2 distance to be small between the
reconstructed and the input image. Here, we use the capsule corresponding to the targeted label
to perform the reconstruction, that is:
δ ← clipε(δ − c · (1−β ) · sign(∇δ (‖ry(x+δ )− (x+δ )‖2)), (2.4)
where ry(x+ δ ) is the reconstructed image that using label y to mask out the capsules/layers
corresponding to all the other classes in CapsNet and CNN+CR models. Instead, CNN+R
network uses the entire penultimate layer for reconstruction. Similarly, β is to balance the
importance between the success rate and the detected rate of the constructed adversarial example.
Figure 2.5 shows the plot of success rate and undetected rate versus the hyperparameter β which
balances the importance between success rate and undetected rate in the targeted reconstructive
PGD attacks on the MNIST dataset.
Because the targeted label is given, another way to construct targeted reconstructive
attacks is to combine these two stages into one stage via minimizing the loss function ` =
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Targeted Reconstructive PGD Attack on the MNIST Dateset
Figure 2.5. An example shows the plot of the success rate in (a) and undetected rate in (b)
of targeted reconstructive PGD attack vesus the hyperparameter beta β for each model on the
MNIST test set. We set the max `∞ norm ε = 0.3 to create the attacks.
β · `net( f (x+δ ),y)+(1−β ) · ‖r(v f (x+δ ))− (x+δ )‖2. We implemented both of these targeted
reconstructive attacks and found that the two-stage version is a stronger attack. Therefore,
all the Reconstructive Attack experiments performed in this chapter are based on two-stage
optimization.
We build our reconstructive attack based on the standard PGD attack, denoted as R-PGD,
and test the performance of our detection models against this reconstructive attack in a white-
box setting. Comparing Table 2.2 and Table 2.4, we can see that the Reconstructive Attack is
significantly less successful at changing the models prediction (lower success rates than the
standard attack). However, this attack is more successful at fooling our detection method. For
all attacks and datasets the capsule model has the lowest attack success rate and the lowest
undetected rate.
In addition, we report the undetected rate of the white-box targeted defense-aware R-PGD
attack versus the False Positive Rate on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN datasets in
Figure 2.6. We can clearly see that the undetected rate of the defense-aware attack against
CapsNet is significantly smaller than the CNN-based networks, which suggests that CapsNets
are more robust against adversarial attacks. Furthermore, CNN with class-conditional reconstruc-
tion (CNN+CR) has smaller undetected rate at the same False Positive Rate compared to the
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Table 2.4. Success rate and the worst case undetected rate of white-box targeted and untargeted
reconstructive attacks. Below St/Rt is shown for targeted attacks and Su/Ru is presented for
untargeted attacks.
Networks
Targeted (%) Untargeted (%)
R-FGSM R-BIM R-PGD R-FGSM R-BIM R-PGD
MNIST Dataset
CapsNet 1.8/0.3 51.0/33.8 50.7/33.7 6.1/1.0 84.5/35.1 88.1/37.9
CNN+CR 7.6/0.5 98.0/68.1 98.6/68.1 41.7/3.2 96.5/86.8 99.4/87.7
CNN+R 16.9/3.3 86.3/65.9 95.5/71.2 25.9/8.1 82.9/67.8 95.1/70.5
FASHION MNIST Dataset
CapsNet 6.5/5.8 53.3/28.4 53.7/29.8 33.3/29.9 85.3/75.9 84.9/75.5
CNN+CR 17.7/14.0 80.3/72.4 78.1/72.0 68.0/57.3 89.8/84.4 91.5/86.0
CNN+R 19.4/17.6 95.2/88.8 94.6/88.4 58.6/53.5 98.8/90.1 98.9/90.0
SVHN Dataset
CapsNet 21.6/21.2 81.1/78.3 82.0/79.2 71.6/68.3 98.9/97.5 98.9/97.5
CNN+CR 24.2/22.6 98.5/97.6 99.0/97.9 86.0/82.3 99.9/99.5 99.9/99.5
CNN+R 26.6/25.8 99.6/99.4 99.5/99.3 87.1/84.5 100.0/99.9 100.0/99.9
CNN without class-conditional reconstruction (CNN+R), which suggests the class-conditional
information is helpful in our models to improve the robustness against adversarial attacks.
2.5.7 Black-box Attacks
We also tested our detection mechanism results on black box attacks, shown in Table 2.5.
Given the low undetected rates in the white-box settings, it is not surprising that our detection
Figure 2.6. The undetected rate of the white-box targeted defense-aware R-PGD attack versus
the False Positive Rate on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST and SVHN datasets.
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Table 2.5. Success rate and undetected rate of black-box targeted and untargeted attacks on
the MNIST dataset. In the table, St/Rt is shown for targeted attacks and Su/Ru is presented for
untargeted attacks. All the numbers are shown in %.
Targeted CapsNet CNN-CR CNN-R Untargeted CapsNet CNN-CR CNN-R
PGD 1.5/0.0 7.8/0.0 7.4/0.0 PGD 8.5/0.0 32.6/0.0 27.6/0.0
R-PGD 4.2/1.0 18.3/11.0 11.3/4.8 R-PGD 10.4/2.4 42.7/24.9 25.2/8.9
method is able to detect black box attacks as well. In fact, on the MNIST dataset the capsule
model is able to detect all targeted and untargeted PGD attacks. Both the CNN-R and the
CNN-CR models are able to detect the black box attacks as well, but with a relatively higher
undetected rate.
2.5.8 CIFAR-10 Dataset
In order to show that our method based on CapsNet is capable to scale up to more
complex datasets, we test our detection method with a deeper reconstruction network on CIFAR-
10 [32]. The classification accuracy on the clean test dataset is 92.2%. In addition, we display
the undetected rate of the white-box/black-box defense-aware R-PGD attack against CapsNets
versus the False Positive Rate in Figure 2.7 (Left), where we can see a significant drop of the
undetected rate of black-box R-PGD compared to the white-box setting. This indicates the
CapsNets greatly reduce the attack transferability and the threat of black-box attacks.
Class-conditional Information
To investigate the effectiveness of the class-conditional information in the reconstruction
network, we compare our CapsNet based on [54] with the other two variants of CapsNets:
“CapsNet All” and “DeepCaps” [51]. In “CapsNet All”, we remove the masking mechanism in the
CapsNet and use all the capsules to do the reconstruction. In “DeepCaps”, we extract the winning-
capsule information as a single vector and used it as the input for the reconstruction network
instead of using a masking mechanism to mask out the losing capsules information. In this way,
the class information is not explicitly fed into the reconstruction network. As shown in Figure 2.7
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Figure 2.7. Left: The undetected rate of white-box/black-box defense-aware R-PGD versus the
Fasle Positive Rate for the clean examples. The test model is our CapsNet. Right: The undetected
rate of white-box defense-aware R-PGD versus the Fasle Positive Rate for the clean examples.
The test model is our CapsNet using class-conditional reconstruction, “CapsNet All” using all
capsule information, and the DeepCaps [51] using class-independent capsule information. The
defense-aware R-PGD attack is tested on the CIFAR-10 dataset with ε∞ = 8/255.
(right), our CapsNet has the best detection performance (the lowest undetected rate at the same
False Positive Rate) compared to the other two Capsule models. “DeepCaps” performs slightly
worse that our “CapsNet” and “CapsNet All” has the worst detection performance. Therefore, we
conclude that the class-conditional information used in the reconstruction network increases the
model’s robustness to adversarial attack. This also holds true to CNN-based networks because
CNN+CR has a better detection performance than CNN+R, shown in Figure 2.6.
2.6 Discussion
Our detection mechanism relies on a similarity metric (i.e. a measure of reconstruction
error) between the reconstruction and the input. This metric is required both during training
in order to train the reconstruction network and during test time in order to flag adversarial
examples. In the four datasets we have evaluated, the distance between examples roughly
correlates with semantic similarity. This however might not the case for images in more complex
dataset such as SUN dataset [69] and ImageNet [15], in which two images may be similar
in terms of semantic content but nevertheless have significant `2 distance. A better similarity
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metric [67, 74] can be further explored to extend our methods to more complex problems.
Furthermore our reconstruction network is trained on a hidden representation of one class but is
trained to reconstruct the entire input. In datasets without distractors or backgrounds, this is not
a problem. But in the case of ImageNet, in which the object responsible for the classification is
not the only object in the image, attempting to reconstruct the entire input from a class encoding
seems misguided.
2.7 Conclusion
We have presented a class-conditional reconstruction-based detection method that does
not rely on a specific predefined adversarial attack. We have shown that by reconstructing the
input from the internal class-conditional representation, our system is able to accurately detect
black-box and white-box FGSM, BIM, PGD, and CW attacks. We then proposed a new attack
to beat our defense - the Reconstructive Attack - in which the adversary optimizes not only the
classification loss but also minimizes the reconstruction loss. We showed that this attack was
able to fool our detection mechanism but with a much smaller success rate than a standard attack.
Compared to CNN-based models, we showed that the CapsNet was able to detect adversarial
examples with greater accuracy on all the datasets we explored.
This chapter is based on the material as it appears in the Proceedings of the International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR20) (Yao Qin, Nicholas Frosst, Sara Sabour,
Colin Raffel, Garrison Cottrell and Geoffrey Hinton, “Detecting and Diagnosing Adversarial
Images with Class-Conditional Capsule Reconstructions”). The dissertation author was the
co-primary investigator and author of this paper.
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Chapter 3
Diagnosing Adversarial Attacks
3.1 Introduction
Adversarial examples raise questions about whether neural network models are sensitive
to the same visual features as humans. In the previous Chapter, we find that CapsNets always
perform better than convolutional networks among all the attacks. To explain the success of
CapsNets over CNNs, we further diagnose the adversarial examples for CapsNets and find that
1) the success of the targeted reconstructive attack is highly dependent on the visual similarity
between the source image and the target class. 2) many of the resultant attacks resemble members
of the target class and so cease to be “adversarial” – i.e., they may also be misclassified by
humans. These findings suggest that CapsNets with class conditional reconstructions have the
potential to address the real issue with adversarial examples – networks should make predictions
based on the same properties of the image as people use rather than using features that can be
manipulated by an imperceptible adversarial attack. Based on extensive qualitative studies, we
conclude that CapsNets is better at detecting adversarial examples compared to CNNs, suggesting
the features captured by CapsNets are more aligned with human perception.
3.2 Visual Coherence of the Reconstructive Attack
The great success of CapsNet over CNN-based models motivates us to further diagnose
the generated adversarial examples for CapsNets. If our true aim in adversarial robustness
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Figure 3.1. This diagram visualizes the adversarial success rates for each source/target pair for
targeted R-PGD attacks on Fashion-MNIST with ε∞ = 25/255. The size of the box at position x,
y represents the success rate of adversarially perturbing inputs of class x to be classified as class
y. Almost all source/target We can see that there is significantly higher variance for the CapsNet
model than for the two CNN models.
research is to create models that make predictions based on reasonable and human-observable
features, then we would prefer models that are more likely to misclassify a “shirt” as a “t-shirt”
(in the case of FashionMNIST) than to misclassify a “bag” as a “sweater”. For a model to
behave ideally, the success of an adversarial perturbation would be related to the visual similarity
between the source and the target class. By visualizing a matrix of adversarial success rates
between each pair of classes (shown in Figure 3.1), we can see that for the capsule model there
is a great variance between the source and target class pairs and that the success rate of attacks is
highly related to the visual similarity of the classes. However, this is not the case for either of the
other two CNN-based models.
Thus far we have treated all attacks as equal. However, a key component of an adversarial
example is that it is visually similar to the source image, and that it does not resemble the
adversarial target class. The adversarial research community makes use of a small epsilon
bound as a mechanism for ensuring that the resultant adversarial attacks are visually unchanged
from the source image. For standard attacks this heuristic is sufficient, because taking gradient
steps in the image space in order to have a network misclassify an image normally results in
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Figure 3.2. These are randomly sampled (not cherry picked) successful and undetected ad-
versarial attacks created by R-PGD with a target class of 0 for each model on the SVHN
dataset(ε∞ = 25/255). We can see that for the capsule model, many of the attacks are not
“adversarial” as they resemble members of the target class.
something visually similar to the source image. But this is not the case for adversarial attacks
which take the reconstruction error into account: As shown in Figure 3.2, when we use R-PGD
to attack the CapsNet, many of the resultant attacks resemble members of the target class. In this
way, they stop being “adversarial”. As such, an attack detection method which does not detect
them as adversarial is arguably behaving correctly. This puts the previously undetected rates
presented earlier in a new light, and illustrates a difficulty in the evaluation of adversarial attacks
and defenses. In addition, it should be noted that this phenomenon rarely occurs in a standard
convolutional neural network, which suggests that the features captured by CapsNet are more
aligned with human perception.
In Figure 3.3, we display sample images and the result of adversarially perturbing them
with targeted R-PGD against the CapsNet model. We can see the visual similarity between many
of the attacks and the target class.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we further explain the success of CapsNet by qualitatively showing that
the success of the reconstructive attack was proportional to the visual similarity between the
target class and the source class for the CapsNet. In addition, we showed that images generated
by this reconstructive attack to attack the CapsNet are not typically adversarial, i.e. many of
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Figure 3.3. These are randomly sampled (not cherry picked) inputs (top row) and the result of
adversarially perturbing them with targeted R-PGD against the CapsNet model (other rows).
Many of these attacks are not successful.
the resultant attacks resemble members of the target class even with a small `∞ norm bound.
These are not the case for the CNN-based models. The extensive qualitative studies indicate that
the gradient of the reconstructive attack may be better aligned with the true data manifold, and
implies that the capsule model relies on visual features similar to those used by humans. We
believe this is a step towards solving the true problem posed by adversarial examples.
This chapter is based on the material as it appears in the Proceedings of the International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR20) (Yao Qin, Nicholas Frosst, Sara Sabour,
Colin Raffel, Garrison Cottrell and Geoffrey Hinton, “Detecting and Diagnosing Adversarial
Images with Class-Conditional Capsule Reconstructions”). The dissertation author was the
co-primary investigator and author of this paper.
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Chapter 4
Deflecting Adversarial Attacks
4.1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks have been the subject of constant research since they were first
discovered [64, 21, 34, 41]. Most of this research has been focused on the creation of more robust
models to defend against adversarial attacks [61, 41, 71], where the input image is correctly
classified as the original class rather than the adversarial target class, as illustrated in Figure 4.1
(a). However, better defenses have led to the development of stronger attack algorithms to break
these defenses [41, 10, 13, 2]. After several iterations of creating and breaking defenses, some
research focused on adversarial attack detection [22, 16, 43, 37, 50, 52]. Detection algorithms
aim to distinguish adversarial attacks from real data and then flag the adversarial input, instead
of attempting to correctly classify such inputs, as shown in Figure 4.1 (b). However, this
strategy fell into the same creating/breaking cycle: Many state-of-the-art methods [52, 40, 37]
claiming to detect adversarial attacks were broken shortly after publication with a defense-aware
attack [25, 9, 2]. We attempt to get ahead of this cycle by focusing on the deflection of adversarial
attacks, shown in Figure 4.1 (c): If the result of the adversarial optimization of an image looks to
a human like the adversarial target class rather than its original class, then the image can hardly
be called adversarial anymore. We call such attacks “deflected”. Some examples are shown in
Figure 4.2. Although visually there is a big difference between clean input and deflected attacks,
we have confirmed the maximal adversarial perturbation is bounded by 16/255 via reading the
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Figure 4.1. Different results of an adversarial attack against three different defense approaches.
The original class is 0 and the adversarial target class is 8.
clean image and its corresponding deflected attack and computing the difference of their pixel
value.
In this chapter, we propose a network and detection mechanism based on Capsule
layers [54, 50] that either detects attacks accurately or, for undetected attacks, often causes the
attacker to produce images that resemble the target class (thereby deflecting them). Our network
architecture is made up of two components: A capsule classification network that classifies
the input, and a reconstruction network that reconstructs the input conditioned on the pose
parameters of the predicted capsule. Apart from the classification loss and `2 reconstruction
loss used in [54, 50], we introduce an extra cycle-consistency training loss which constrains
the classification of the winning capsule reconstruction to be the same as the classification of
the original input. This new auxiliary training loss encourages the reconstructions to more
closely match the class-conditional distribution and helps the model detect and deflect adversarial
attacks.
In addition, we propose two new attack-agnostic detection methods based on the discrep-
ancy between the winning-capsule reconstruction of clean and adversarial inputs. We find that a
detection method that combines ours with the one proposed by [50] performs best. We show
that this method can accurately detect white-box and black-box attacks based on three different
distortion metrics (EAD [13], CW [10] and PGD [41]) on both the SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets.
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Figure 4.2. Deflected adversarial attacks on the SVHN dataset. These images were generated by
a defense aware attack and the maximal adversarial perturbation is bounded by 16/255.
Following the suggestions in [2, 9], we also propose defense-aware attacks for our new detection
method. We find that our detection methods significantly outperform state-of-the-art methods on
defense-aware attacks. Finally, we perform a human study to verify that many of the undetected
adversarial attacks against our model have been successfully deflected, i.e. adversarial images
from both defense-aware and standard attacks against our detection mechanism are frequently
classified as the target class by humans. In contrast, successful attacks against baseline models
do not have this property.
To summarize, in this chapter:
• We introduce the notion of deflecting adversarial attacks, which presents a step towards
ending the battle between attacks and defenses.
• We propose a new cycle-consistency loss which trains a CapsNet to encourage the winning-
capsule reconstruction to closely match the class-conditional distribution and show that
this can help detect and deflect adversarial attacks.
• We introduce two attack-agnostic detection methods based on the discrepancy between
the winning-capsule reconstruction of the clean and adversarial inputs, and design a
defense-aware attack to specifically attack our detection mechanisms.
• We show through extensive experiments on SVHN and CIFAR-10 that our detection
mechanism can achieve state-of-the-art performance in detecting white-/black-box standard
31
and defense-aware attacks.
• We perform a human study to show that our approach, unlike previous methods, is able to
deflect a large percentage of undetected adversarial attacks.
4.2 Network Architecture
In order to design a model that is strong enough to deflect adversarial attacks, we build
our network based on CapsNet [54]. Figure 4.3 shows the pipeline of our network architecture.
Classification
Network
…
0
1
1
0
0
1
0…
Input Reconstruction
Winning
Losing
Capsules
…Background
Mask
…
Reconstruction
Network
Classified as 2
Losing
Losing
Losing
Background
Figure 4.3. The network architecture with cycle-consistent winning capsule reconstructions.
The final layer of our classifier is a Capsule layer (“CapsLayer” for short) which includes both
class capsules and background capsules. These capsules are intended to encode feature attributes
corresponding to the class and the background respectively. Given an input x, the output of a
CapsLayer is a prediction f (x) and a pose parameter v for all the classes and the background,
where vi denotes the pose parameter for class i. As in the initial Capsules proposed in [54],
the magnitude of the activation vector of a capsule encodes the existence of an instance of
the class and the orientation of the activation vector encodes instantiation parameters of the
instance, such as its pose. Therefore, the magnitudes of the capsules’ activations are used to
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perform classification while the activation vector of the winning class capsule together with
the activation vectors of the background capsules are used as the input to the reconstruction
network. We use r(vi= f (x)) and r(vi6= f (x)) to represent the reconstruction from the winning
capsule and a losing capsule respectively. The reconstruction network uses the activations of
all the background capsules as well as the activation of one class capsule but we omit this to
simplify the notation. The details of the network architecture used in this chapter are provided in
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
Table 4.1. The network architecture for the SVHN dataset.
Layer Name Configurations
Classification
Network
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x8, stride size: 1x1,
activations: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x4, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x1, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 64x2, stride size: 1x1,
activation: leaky relu
CapsLayer
number of input capsules: 16, input atoms: 512,
number of output capsules: 25, output atoms: 4,
number of dynamic routing: 1
Reconstruction
Network
fully connected input size: 100, output size:1024
fully connected input size: 1024, output size:16384
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 64, stride size: 2x2
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 32, stride size: 2x2
conv
filter size: 4x4 number of filters: 3, stride size: 1x1,
activation: sigmoid
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Table 4.2. The network architecture for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Layer Name Configurations
Classification
Network
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x4,
stride size: 1x1, activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x8,
stride size: 1x1, activations: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x2,
stride size: 1x1, activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x4,
stride size: 1x1, activation: leaky relu
Avg Pooling pool size: 2x2, stride size: 2x2
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x1,
stride size: 1x1, activation: leaky relu
Conv
filter size: 3x3, number of filters: 128x2,
stride size: 1x1, activation: leaky relu
CapsLayer
number of input capsules: 16, input atoms: 512,
number of output capsules: 25, output atoms: 8,
number of dynamic routing: 1
Reconstruction
Network
fully connected input size: 200, output size:1024
fully connected input size: 1024, output size:16384
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 64, stride size: 2x2
deconv filter size: 4x4, number of filters: 32, stride size: 2x2
conv
filter size: 4x4 number of filters: 3, stride size: 1x1,
activation: sigmoid
4.2.1 Cycle-consistent winning-capsule reconstructions
The CapsNet [54] is trained with two loss terms: a marginal loss for the classification
and an `2 reconstruction loss. To encourage the reconstruction to more closely match the class
conditional distribution and help the model detect and deflect adversarial attacks, we additionally
incorporate an extra cycle-consistency loss `cyc which constrains the reconstruction from the
winning capsule to be classified as the same class as the input, formulated as:
`cyc = `net( f (r(vi= f (x))), f (x)), (4.1)
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where `net is the cross-entropy loss function and i∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}, n denotes the number of classes
in the dataset. This can be achieved by feeding the reconstruction corresponding to the winning
capsule back into the classification network, shown as the dotted red line in Figure 4.3. This extra
training loss together with our Cycle-consistent Detector (introduced in Section 4.3.3) can help
detect adversarial attacks. In addition, since the winning-capsule reconstructions are optimized
to more closely match the class conditional data distribution, it becomes easier for our model to
deflect adversarial attacks.
4.3 Detection Methods
In this chapter, we use three reconstruction-based detection methods to detect standard
attacks. They are: Global Threshold Detector (GTD), first proposed in [50], Local Best Detector
(LBD) and Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD).
4.3.1 Global Threshold Detector
When the input is adversarially perturbed, the classification given to the input may be
incorrect, but the reconstruction is often blurry and therefore the distance between the adversarial
input and the reconstruction is larger than that would be expected from normal input. This allows
us to detect the input as adversarial with the Global Threshold Detector. This method, proposed
in [50], measures the reconstruction error between the input and its reconstruction from the
winning capsule. If the reconstruction error is greater than a global threshold θ , that is:
‖r(vi= f (x))− x‖2 > θ , (4.2)
then the input is flagged as an adversarial example.
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Figure 4.4. An example of a clean input, an adversarial example generated via a PGD attack,
and the reconstructions for the clean and adversarial inputs from each class capsule. The
reconstruction corresponding to the winning capsule is surrounded by a red box. Under each
reconstruction is its `2 reconstruction error; the smallest reconstruction error is highlighted in red.
Both the clean input and its winning capsule reconstruction are classified as ‘4’. The PGD attack
is classified as the target class ‘3’ but its winning capsule reconstruction is classified as ‘4’.
4.3.2 Local Best Detector
When the input is a clean image, the reconstruction error from the winning capsule is
smaller than that of the losing capsules, where an example is shown in the first row of Figure 4.4.
This is likely because the `2 reconstruction objective only minimizes the reconstruction from
the winning capsule during training. However, when the input is an adversarial example, the
reconstruction from the capsule corresponding to the correct label can be even closer to the input
compared to the reconstruction corresponding to the winning capsule (see the second row in
Figure 4.4). Therefore, we propose the “Local Best Detector” (LBD) to detect such adversarial
images whose reconstruction error from the winning capsule is not the smallest, that is:
argmin j‖r(v j)− x‖2 6= f (x), j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}, (4.3)
where n is the number of classes in the dataset.
4.3.3 Cycle-Consistency Detector
If the input is a clean image, the reconstruction from the winning capsule will resemble
the input. Our model should ideally assign the same class to the reconstruction of the winning
capsule as the clean input. This behavior is reinforced by training with the cycle-consistency loss.
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For example, as shown in Figure 4.4 both the clean input and its winning-capsule reconstruction
are classified as 4. However, when the input is an adversarial example which is perceptually
indistinguishable from the clean image but causes the model to predict the target class, the
reconstruction of the winning capsule often appears closer to the clean input and/or is blurry.
As a result, the reconstruction of the winning capsule is often not classified as the target class.
As shown in Figure 4.4, the adversarial input has been classified as the target class “3” while
the reconstruction corresponding to the winning capsule is classified as “4”. Therefore, the
Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD) is designed to flag the input as an adversarial example if the
input x and its reconstruction of the winning capsule r(vi= f (x)) are not classified as the same
class:
f (r(vi= f (x))) 6= f (x). (4.4)
In this chapter, we use these three detectors together to detect adversarial examples.
In other words, we flag any input as adversarial if it is classified as adversarial by any of the
detection mechanisms. As a result, an adversarial input can only go undetected if it passes all
three detection mechanisms.
4.4 The Defense-Aware CC-PGD Attack
In order for an attack mechanism to generate an adversarial example x′ = x+δ (where δ
is a small adversarial perturbation) that can both cause a misclassification and is not detected by
our detection mechanisms, the constructed adversarial attack must:
• successfully fool the classifier: f (x′) = t and f (x) 6= t, where t is the target class.
• avoid being detected by the Global Threshold Detector (GTD), the attack needs to constrain
the reconstruction of the winning capsule to be close to the input.
• fool the Local Best Detector (LBD), the attack should encourage the reconstructions from
all the losing capsules to be far away from the input to ensure the reconstruction error of
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the winning capsule is the smallest.
• circumvent the Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD) by fooling the classifier into making
the target prediction when it is fed the winning-capsule reconstruction of the adversarial
input, that is: f (r(vi= f (x′))) = f (x′) = t.
To generate such an attack, we follow [50] and devise attacks which consist of two stages
at each gradient step. The first stage attempts to fool the classifier by following a standard attack
(e.g., a standard PGD attack) which follows the gradient of the cross-entropy loss function with
respect to the input. Then, in the second stage, we focus on fooling the detection mechanisms by
taking the reconstruction error and cycle-consistency into consideration. This can be formulated
as minimizing the reconstruction loss `r, which consists of three components: the reconstruction
loss corresponding to the Global Threshold Detector `g, the reconstruction loss corresponding
to the Local Best Detector `l and the cycle-consistency classification loss corresponding to the
Cycle-Consistency Detector `cyc. Specifically, the reconstruction loss is defined as:
`r(x′) = α1 · `g(x′)+α2 · `l(x′)+α3 · `cyc(x′)
= α1 · ‖r(vi= f (x′))− x′‖2−α2 ·
∑nk 6= f (x′)‖r(vk)− x′‖2
n−1
+α3 · `net( f (r(vi= f (x′))), f (x′))
(4.5)
where x′ = x+ δ is the adversarial example, n is the number of the classes in the dataset,
‖r(vi= f (x′))− x′‖2 is the winning-capsule reconstruction error and ‖r(vk 6= f (x′))− x′‖2 is the
losing-capsule reconstruction error. The hyperparameters α1, α2 and α3 are used to balance the
importance of attacking each detector. Then, the adversarial perturbation can be updated in the
second stage as:
δ ← clipε∞(δ − c · sign(∇δ (`r(x+δ ))), (4.6)
where ε∞ is the `∞ norm bound and c is the step size in each iteration.
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4.5 Experiments
Now that we have proposed our new defense model, we first verify its detection perfor-
mance on the SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets on a variety of attacks. Then, we use a human study
to demonstrate that our model frequently causes attacks to be deflected.
4.5.1 Evaluation Metrics and Datasets
In this chapter, we use Accuracy to represent the proportion of clean examples that are
correctly classified by our network. We use Success Rate to measure the performance of an
attack, which is defined as the proportion of adversarial examples that successfully fool the
classifier into making the targeted prediction. In order to evaluate the performance of different
detection mechanisms, we report both False Positive Rate (FPR) and Undetected Rate. The
False Positive Rate is the proportion of clean examples that are flagged as an adversarial example
by the detection mechanism. The Undetected Rate, first proposed in [50], denotes the proportion
of adversarial examples that successfully fool the classifier and also go undetected. Finally, we
perform a human study in Section 4.6 in order to show that our model is able to effectively
deflect adversarial attacks.
4.5.2 Training Details and Test Accuracy
We set the batch size to be 64 and the learning rate to 0.0001 to train the network on
SVHN. For CIFAR-10, the batch size is set to be 128 and the learning rate is 0.0002. We use
the Adam optimizer [31] to train all models. The cycle-consistency loss `cyc is multiplied with
0.0005 before being added to the margin loss and the `2 reconstruction loss used as in the original
CapsNets [54].
We test our deflecting models on the SVHN [47] and CIFAR-10 datasets [32]. The
classification accuracy on the clean test set is 96.5% on SVHN and 92.6% on CIFAR-10, which
show that our deflecting models are reasonably good at classifying clean images.
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4.5.3 Threat Model
In this chapter, we consider two commonly used threat models: white-box and black-
box. For white-box attacks, the adversary has full knowledge of the network architecture and
parameters and is allowed to construct the adversarial attack by computing the gradient of
model’s output with respect to its input. In the black-box setting, the adversary is aware of
the network architecture of the target model but does not have direct access to the model’s
parameters.
4.5.4 Adversarial Attacks
Following the suggestions in [7], we test our attack-agnostic detection mechanisms on
three standard targeted attacks based on different distance metrics:
• `1 norm-based EAD [13],
• `2 norm-based CW [10],
• `∞ norm-based PGD [41].
In addition, we follow the suggestions in [9] to report the performance of our detection
mechanisms against defense-aware attacks. We use CC-PGD (described in Section 4.4) as our
defense-aware attack. For the `∞ norm-based attacks, we set the maximal perturbation ε∞ to be
16/255 on SVHN and 8/255 on CIFAR-10 as is typically used [6, 41].
To generate EAD and CW attacks, we follow the previous work [13, 10] to set the binary
search steps to be 9, maximum iterations to be 1000 and learning rate to be 0.01. To construct `∞
norm-based attacks (PGD and our defense-aware CC-PGD), we use a step size 0.01 (2.55/255)
in each iteration as [41].
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4.5.5 Sanity Checks for PGD and CC-PGD Attack
In this section, we perform basic sanity checks to ensure the adversarial attacks are
correctly implemented and our proposed defense-aware CC-PGD is tuned well. In this section,
we test attacks against our proposed deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Figure 4.5. (a) The success rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD changes as the number of
iterations increases for our deflecting model on CIFAR-10 dataset. (b) The success rate of
white-box PGD and CC-PGD changes as ε∞ increases for our deflecting model on CIFAR-10
dataset. (c) The Undetected Rate of the defense-aware attack CC-PGD optimized by a two-
stage optimization and one-stage optimization vs. False Positive Rate for the clean data on the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
• Convergence of attacks.
Figure 4.5 (a) shows the success rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD varies as the number
of iterations increases on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We can see that the attacker has almost
plateaued after 200 iterations. Therefore, we set the total number of attack steps to be 200
in generating PGD and CC-PGD attack for efficiency.
• 100% success rate with non-constraint `∞ norm.
In Figure 4.5 (b), we show that the success rate of white-box PGD and CC-PGD varies
as the `∞ bound of the adversarial perturbation ε∞ increases. We can see that when ε∞ is
greater than 50/255, the success rate is 100%. However, when ε∞ is set to be 8/255 (which
is typically used [6, 41]), the attack success rate against our deflecting model is below
50%.
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Figure 4.6. The undetected rate of our white-box defense-aware CC-PGD attack versus
False Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the CIFAR-10 dataset when we change the
hyperparameter α2 in (a) and hyperparameter α3 in (b). These hyperparameters control
the importance of attacking each detector in Eqn. 5.13.
• Two-stage optimization
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our used two-stage optimization in generating defense-
aware CC-PGD, we compare the attack performance of two-stage optimization introduced
in Section 4.4 and a one-stage optimization which uses a single loss function which
combines the cross-entropy loss to fool the classifier with the reconstruction loss `r
in Eqn. 5.13 to fool the detectors. In Figure 4.5 (c), we construct the defense-aware
CC-PGD against our deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 dataset using one-stage and
two-stage optimization respectively. We can see that the defense-aware CC-PGD attack
that is optimized by the two-stage optimization has a higher undetected rate than that
optimized by the one-stage optimization. Therefore, we use two-stage optimization in all
the experiments to construct CC-PGD attack.
• Hyperparameters
In Eqn. 5.13, the hyperparameters α1, α2 and α3 are used to balance the importance
of attacking each detector. We set α1 = 1 and then show the attack performance when
we change α2 (see Figure 4.6 (a)) and α3 (see Figure 4.6 (b)). We can see that when
we set α2 = 0, the attack performance is the best (higher undetected rate at a low False
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Positive Rate). In addition, the attack performance of our CC-PGD is not sensitive to
the hyperparameter α3. Therefore, we simply set α3 = 20, which is slightly better at a
low False Positive Rate. In all the following experiments, we set the hyperparameter α1,
α2 and α3 in Eqn. 5.13 to be 1, 0 and 20 respectively to balance the importance among
three detectors in generating our defense-aware CC-PGD. Since the Cycle-Consistency
Detector is the most effective detector (discussed later in Section 4.5.6), we assign a
much higher weight to α3, which controls the importance of attacking Cycle-Consistency
Detection in generating our defense-aware CC-PGD attack. In addition, we observe that
increasing α2 (controlling the importance of attacking the Local Best Detector) leads to a
decrease of the attack performance). Therefore, α2 is set to be 0. This might result from
the contradiction between minimizing the winning-capsule reconstruction and maximizing
the losing-capsule reconstruction, where they share the background capsule information.
Lastly, α1 is set to be a very small value as 1 for the best attack performance for CC-PGD.
The parameter that balances the importance of the two stages in CC-PGD is empirically set
to be 0.5 on SVHN and 0.75 for the first stage and 0.25 for the second stage on CIFAR-10.
4.5.6 Ablation Study
• Detection methods
In this section, we study the effectiveness of our proposed detection mechanisms: Local
Best Detector (LBD) and Cycle-Consistency Detector (CCD) and compare them with the
Global Threshold Detector (GTD) from [50].
Since the False Positive Rate (FPR) of clean input flagged by the Global Threshold Detector
(GTD) varies as the chosen global threshold, in Figure 4.7 we plot the undetected rate
of white-box adversarial attacks flagged by different detectors versus the False Positive
Rate (FPR) of the clean input. The global threshold θ is chosen from the range [0, 20]
with a step size of 0.4. We can clearly see that: 1) A single Global Threshold Detector
(GTD) proposed in [50] is not enough to effectively detect adversarial attacks. 2) In the
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Figure 4.7. The Undetected Rate of different detectors for white-box attacks versus False
Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the SVHN dataset. “All” denotes GTD, LBD and
CCD are all used to detect adversarial attacks. The better detection mechanism has a
smaller FPR for clean input and smaller undetected rate for attacks.
standard EAD, CW and PGD attack, the CCD is the most effective detector at a low False
Positive Rate. However, it becomes less effective than LBD when the inputs are created
with the defense-aware CC-PGD attack which is designed to specifically attack the three
detection mechanisms. 3) In all the attacks, the combination of all three detectors always
performs the best. Therefore, we only report the performance of the undetected rate of the
combination of all three detectors in the following experiments.
• Cycle-consistency loss
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed cycle-consistency loss, we construct a
baseline Capsule model that has the same network architecture as our deflecting model
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but is trained without the extra cycle-consistency loss. The False Positive Rate of the
Cycle-Consistency Detector on the CIFAR-10 test set is 33.46%, which represents that
33.46% of the clean test images are incorrectly flagged as an adversarial example by the
Cycle-Consistency Detector. This means the Cycle-Consistency Detector is not suitable
for a model that is trained without cycle-consistency loss. Therefore, to compare the
detection performance between the baseline Capsule model and our deflecting model, we
use a combined Global Threshold Detector (GTD) and Local Best Detector (LBD) for the
baseline Capsule model and all three detectors for the deflecting model. The undetected
rate of the white-box defense-aware attack versus the False Positive Rate (FPR) of the clean
input on the CIFAR-10 dataset is shown in Figure 4.8, where we can see that our deflecting
model together with all three detectors has a better detection performance compared to the
baseline model trained without the cycle-consistency loss.
Figure 4.8. Ablation study for cycle-consistency loss. The Undetected Rate of the defense-aware
attack vs. False Positive Rate for baseline Capsule model trained without cycle-consistency loss
and our deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 dataset. GTD and LBD are used to detect adversarial
examples in baseline Capsule model. GTD, LBD and CCD are all used to detect adversarial
attacks for our deflecting model.
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4.5.7 Detection of White-box Attacks
Before showing that our defense produces deflected attacks, we must first validate that it
improves detection performance. Therefore, we test our model on standard and defense-aware
attacks and compare it with state-of-the-art detection methods in this section.
• Standard attacks
As shown in Figure 4.9, our detection method has a very small undetected rate for standard
white-box attacks on both the SVHN and CIFAR-10 dataset. For PGD attacks, we achieve
an undetected rate below 10% with a small False Positive Rate on the SVHN dataset. The
undetected rate for white-box PGD is around 22% with the smallest False Positive Rate on
the CIFAR-10 dataset. These demonstrate that our detection mechanism is very effective
in detecting standard white-box attacks that are based on different `p norms.
• Defense-aware attacks
Following the suggestions in [9], we test our detection mechanism in the setting where
the adversary is fully aware of the defense (“defense-aware attacks”) using the CC-PGD
attack. Since the PGD attack is stronger than EAD and CW, the first stage of our CC-PGD
attack is to construct an adversarial image via standard PGD and then, in the second stage,
take the reconstruction error and cycle-consistency into consideration in order to fool
the detection methods. In Figure 4.9 we can clearly see the undetected rate of CC-PGD
increases compared to a standard PGD attack. However, there is a significant performance
drop in the success rate of White-box CC-PGD (from PGD: 96.0% to CC-PGD: 69.0% on
SVHN) as shown in Table 4.3. This indicates that the adversary needs to sacrifice some
success rate in order not to be detected by our detection mechanism.
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Figure 4.9. The Undetected Rate for white-box and black-box attacks versus False
Positive Rate (FPR) for clean input on the SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets. The strongest
attack has the largest area under the line.
Table 4.3. Success rate of the white-box and black-box attacks for our deflecting model on
the SVHN and CIFAR-10 dataset.
Dataset
EAD CW PGD CC-PGD
White Black White Black White Black White Black
SVHN 100.0% 10.1% 97.6% 1.7% 96.0% 28.7% 69.0% 37.0%
CIFAR-10 100.0% 6.9% 78.0% 1.6% 49.3% 15.5% 46.8% 12.9%
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Table 4.4. Comparison of the Undetected Rate of the state-of-the-art detection methods on
the CIFAR-10 dataset. For all the models, the maximum `∞ perturbation is ε∞ = 8/255 of the
pixel dynamic range and the False Positive Rate of the clean input are 5%. The best detection
performance are highlighted in bold. (Smaller numbers indicate better detection performance.)
Detection Methods Statistical Test Classifier-based Ours
CW 0.1% 0.0% 4.6%
Defense-aware PGD 97.8% 98.4% 28.9%
• Comparison with State-of-the-Art Detection Methods
We compare our detection methods with the most recent statistical test-based detection
method [52] and a classifier-based detection method proposed in [25]. In Table 4.4, we can
see that although the statistical test [52] and the classifier-based detection method [25] can
detect standard attacks successfully, they both fully fail against defense-aware attacks1. In
contrast, our proposed reconstruction-based detection mechanism has the best undetected
rate in detecting defense-aware adversarial attacks and a very small undetected rate of
4.6% in detecting CW attacks.
4.5.8 Detection of black-box Attacks
To study the effectiveness of our detection mechanisms, we also test our models on
black-box attacks. In Figure 4.9 we can see an over 50% performance drop in the undetected
rate when the inputs are black-box CC-PGD attacks on both datasets. The highest undetected
rate of a black-box attack is around 13% on the CIFAR-10 dataset, which demonstrates that
our detection mechanism can successfully detect black-box defense-aware attacks. In addition,
the great gap of the success rate between white-box and black-box attacks shown in Table 4.3
indicates our defense model significantly reduces the transferability of all kinds of adversarial
attacks.
1The numbers of statistical test and classifier-based detection in the Table 4.4 are extracted from [25]. Since the
success rate of the attacks are close to 100%, the undetected rate is roughly (1 - True Positive Rate).
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4.5.9 Examples of Adversarial Attacks and Reconstructions
We display successful adversarial attacks but detected by our detection mechanism, and
display all the reconstructions when the input are EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks
(on the right) in Figure 4.10 for the SVHN dataset. We also show the successful and detected
adversarial PGD attacks (on the left) and our CC-PGD attacks (on the right) in Figure 4.11 for
CIFAR-10 dataset.
Figure 4.10. Successful but detected adversarial EAD attacks (on the left) and CW attacks (on
the right) and the corresponding capsule reconstructions on SVHN. The first column is the clean
input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column is the winning-capsule
reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to class 0 to 9.
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Figure 4.11. Successful but detected adversarial PGD attacks (on the left) and our CC-PGD
attacks (on the right) and the corresponding capsule reconstructions on CIFAR-10. The first
column is the clean input, the second column is the adversarial example, the third column is the
winning-capsule reconstruction, the last ten columns are the reconstructions corresponding to
class 0 to 9. The maximal `∞ bound to the adversarial perturbation is 8/255.
4.6 Deflected Attacks
The numbers that presented earlier in this chapter have implicitly assumed all adversarial
attacks still resemble the initial class, and therefore classifying them as the target class would
constitute a mistake. This assumption may not be true in practice. We have discussed the ability
of our model to deflect adversarial attacks by having adversarial gradients aligned with the class
conditional data distribution, thereby making adversarial attacks resemble the target class. In
order to quantify these claims we need to evaluate human performance on the adversarial attacks
against our model.
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4.6.1 Human Study on SVHN
In order to validate our claim that our method can deflect adversarial attacks, we per-
formed a human study. We made use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk web service to recruit
participants and asked people to label SVHN digits. Each time, they were shown a single image
which was randomly sampled from the following five different sets: 1) clean images from the
SVHN test set, 2) the undetected and successful black-box PGD and CC-PGD adversarial attacks
against our deflecting model, 3) the undetected and successful white-box PGD and CC-PGD
adversarial attacks against our deflecting model, 4) the successful black-box PGD attacks gener-
ated to attack a standard CNN classifier2, 5) the successful white-box PGD attacks for the CNN
classifier. The maximal adversarial perturbation of all the `∞ norm-based attacks are bounded by
the same ε∞ = 16/255. The recruiters were asked to classify each image as a digit between 0
and 9. If multiple digits occurred in one image, we asked people to label the digit closest to the
center of the image. We did not limit the time that people could spend in labeling each image
and we did not explain the purpose of this study to the users other than it was a research study. In
this way, we had 1500 images labeled in total and each image was labeled by five different users.
We then calculated the percentage of uniformly labeled images that were classified as either the
original class or the adversarial target class. The results are summarized in Figure 4.12.
We can see that 69.7% of successful and undetected black-box attacks against our model
were classified as the adversarial target. This means that when our defense is attacked with
adversarial attacks generated within a standard `∞ bound, not only are the results visibly different
than the source image, they resemble the target class. In this way, these attacks are successfully
deflected and can hardly be said to be adversarial, as the network is classifying them the same
way our human testers classified them. This is not the case for the baseline CNN model, where
only 14.3% of the successful black-box PGD attacks were labeled as the target class. In addition,
compared to the white-box attacks, more undetected and successful adversarial attacks generated
2The CNN classifier has the same network architecture as the classification network in our deflecting model
except that we replace the CapsLayer with a convolutional layer.
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Figure 4.12. The human study results on SVHN. The maximal `∞ perturbation is 16/255.
under the black-box setting are deflected to resemble the target class. This suggests that to attack
our deflecting model in a more practical and challenging setting (black-box), the attack ends up
being deflected in order not to be detected. Some examples of deflected adversarial attacks on
SVHN are shown in Figure 4.13.
4.6.2 Deflected Attacks on CIFAR-10
To show that our model can effectively deflect adversarial attacks on the CIFAR-10
dataset, we have chosen a deflected adversarial attack for each class with a maximal `∞ norm
as 25/255, displayed in Figure 4.13. It is apparent that the clean input has been perturbed to
have the representative features of the target class, in order to fool both the classifier and our
detection mechanisms. As a result, these adversarial attacks are also successfully deflected by
our model. Unlike SVHN, for which human evaluators reliably classified the attacks as the target
label, the generated adversarial attacks against our deflecting model on the CIFAR-10 do not
reliably resemble the target class, though they are much harder to identify than the clean data.
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Figure 4.13. Deflected adversarial attacks on SVHN and CIFAR-10. The maximal `∞ perturba-
tion is 16/255 for SVHN and 25/255 for CIFAR-10.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a new approach which presents a step towards ending
the battle between defenses and attacks by deflecting adversarial attacks. To this end, we
propose a new cycle-consistency loss to encourage the winning-capsule reconstruction of the
CapsNet to closely match the class-conditional distribution. By making use of the three detection
mechanisms, we are able to detect standard adversarial attacks based on three different distance
metrics with a low False Positive Rate on the SVHN and CIFAR-10 datasets. To specifically
attack our detection mechanisms, we propose a defense-aware attack and find that our model
achieves drastically lower undetected rates for defense aware attacks compared to state-of-the-art
methods. In addition, a large percentage of the undetected and successful attacks are deflected
by our model to resemble the adversarial target class, so they cannot be considered as adversarial
any more. This is verified by a human study showing that 70% of the successful and undetected
black-box adversarial attacks are classified unanimously by humans as the target class on the
SVHN dataset.
This chapter has been submitted for publication of the material as it may appear in the
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Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR20)
(Yao Qin, Nicholas Frosst, Colin Raffel, Garrison Cottrell and Geoffrey Hinton, “Deflecting
Adversarial Attacks”). The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this
paper.
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Chapter 5
Designing Adversarial Attacks
5.1 Introduction
Adversarial examples [63] are inputs that have been specifically designed by an adversary
to cause a machine learning algorithm to produce a misclassification [5]. Initial work on adver-
sarial examples focused mainly in the domain of image classification. In order to differentiate
properties of adversarial examples on neural networks in general from properties which hold
true only on images, it is important to study adversarial examples in different domains. Indeed,
adversarial examples are known to exist on domains ranging from reinforcement learning [26] to
reading comprehension [29] to speech recognition [11]. This paper focuses on the latter of these
domains, where [11] showed that any given source audio sample can be perturbed slightly so
that an automatic speech recognition (ASR) system would transcribe the audio as any different
target sentence.
To date, adversarial examples on ASR differ from adversarial examples on images in
two key ways. First, adversarial examples on images are imperceptible to humans: it is possible
to generate an adversarial example without changing the 8-bit brightness representation [63].
Conversely, adversarial examples on ASR systems are often perceptible. While the perturbation
introduced is often small in magnitude, upon listening it is obvious that the added perturbation
is present [57]. Second, adversarial examples on images work in the physical world [33] (e.g.,
even when taking a picture of them). In contrast, adversarial examples on ASR systems do not
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yet work in such an “over-the-air” setting where they are played by a speaker and recorded by a
microphone.
In this chapter, we improve the construction of adversarial examples on ASR and match
the power of attacks on images by developing adversarial examples which are imperceptible,
and make steps towards robust adversarial examples1.
In order to generate imperceptible adversarial examples, we depart from the common
`p distance measure widely used for adversarial example research. Instead, we make use of
the psychoacoustic principle of auditory masking, and only add the adversarial perturbation to
regions of the audio where it will not be heard by a human, even if this perturbation is not “quiet”
in terms of absolute energy.
Further investigating properties of adversarial examples which appear to be different
from images, we examine the ability of an adversary to construct physical-world adversarial
examples [33]. These are inputs that, even after taking into account the distortions introduced
by the physical world, remain adversarial upon classification. We make initial steps towards
developing audio which can be played over-the-air by designing audio which remains adversarial
after being processed by random room-environment simulators [56].
Finally, we additionally demonstrate that our attack is capable of attacking a modern,
state-of-the-art Lingvo ASR system [59].
5.2 Related Work
We build on a long line of work studying the robustness of neural networks. This research
area largely began with [5, 63], who first studied adversarial examples for deep neural networks.
This paper focuses on adversarial examples on automatic speech recognition systems.
Early work in this space [19, 14] was successful when generating untargeted adversarial examples
that produced incorrect, but arbitrary, transcriptions. A concurrent line of work succeeded at
1The project webpage is at http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/∼yaq007/imperceptible-robust-adv.html
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generating targeted attacks in practice, even when played over a speaker and recorded by a
microphone (a so-called “over-the-air” attack) but only by both (a) synthesizing completely new
audio and (b) targeting older, traditional (i.e., not neural network based) speech recognition
systems [8, 73, 60].
These two lines of work were partially unified by [11] who constructed adversarial
perturbations for speech recognition systems targeting arbitrary (multi-word) sentences. However,
this attack was neither effective over-the-air, nor was the adversarial perturbation completely
inaudible; while the perturbations it introduces are very quiet, they can be heard by a human (see
§ 5.7.2). Concurrently, the CommanderSong [72] attack developed adversarial examples that are
effective over-the-air but at a cost of introducing a significant perturbation to the original audio.
Following this, concurrent work with ours develops attacks on deep learning ASR systems
that either work over-the-air or are less obviously perceptible.
• [70], create adversarial examples which can be played over-the-air. These attacks are
highly effective on short two- or three-word phrases, but not on the full-sentence phrases
originally studied. Further, these adversarial examples often have a significantly larger
perturbation, and in one case, the perturbation introduced had a higher magnitude than the
original audio.
• [57] work towards developing attacks that are less perceptible through using “Psychoa-
coustic Hiding” and attack the Kaldi system, which is partially based on neural networks
but also uses some “traditional” components such as a Hidden Markov Model instead of
an RNN for final classification. Because of the system differences we can not directly
compare our results to that of this paper, but we encourage the reader to listen to examples
from both papers.
Our concurrent work manages to achieve both of these results (almost) simultaneously:
we generate adversarial examples that are both nearly imperceptible and also remain effective
after simulated distortions. Simultaneously, we target a state-of-the-art network-based ASR
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system, Lingvo, as opposed to Kaldi and generate full-sentence adversarial examples as opposed
to targeting short phrases.
A final line of work extends adversarial example generation on ASR systems from the
white-box setting (where the adversary has complete knowledge of the underlying classifier) to
the black-box setting [30, 66] (where the adversary is only allowed to query the system). This
work is complementary and independent of ours: we assume a white-box threat model.
5.3 Background
5.3.1 Problem Definition
Given an input audio waveform x, a target transcription y and an automatic speech
recognition (ASR) system f (·) which outputs a final transcription, our objective is to construct an
imperceptible and targeted adversarial example x′ that can attack the ASR system when played
over-the-air. That is, we seek to find a small perturbation δ , which enables x′ = x+δ to meet
three requirements:
• Targeted: the classifier is fooled so that f (x′) = y and f (x) 6= y. Untargeted adversarial
examples on ASR systems often only introduce spelling errors and so are less interesting
to study.
• Imperceptible: x′ sounds so similar to x that humans cannot differentiate x′ and x when
listening to them.
• Robust: x′ is still effective when played by a speaker and recorded by a microphone in an
over-the-air attack. (We do not achieve this goal completely, but do succeed at simulated
environments.)
5.3.2 ASR Model
We mount our attacks on the Lingvo classifier [59], a state-of-the-art sequence-to-
sequence model [62] with attention [4] whose architecture is based on the Listen, Attend and
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Spell (LAS) model [12]. It feeds filter bank spectra into an encoder consisting of a stack of
convolutional and LSTM layers, which conditions an LSTM decoder that outputs the transcription.
The use of the sequence-to-sequence framework allows the entire model to be trained end-to-end
with the standard cross-entropy loss function. The Lingvo system achieves the state-of-the-art
performance for automatic speech recognition. The detailed parameter settings of the Lingvo
classifier is introduced in [59].
The key improvement of LAS over previous CTC-based models (e.g., DeepSpeech) is that
it can outputs the character sequences without making any independence assumption between
the characters. Each character is predicted based on a probability distribution conditioned on
all the characters seen previously. Therefore, the LAS model can output the full transcription
without specific post processing.
5.3.3 Threat Model
In this chapter, as is done in most prior work, we consider the white box threat model
where the adversary has full access to the model as well as its parameters. In particular, the
adversary is allowed to compute gradients through the model in order to generate adversarial
examples.
When we mount over-the-air attacks, we do not assume we know the exact configurations
of the room in which the attack will be performed. Instead, we assume we know the distribution
from which the room will be drawn, and generate adversarial examples so as to be effective on
any room drawn from this distribution.
5.3.4 Adversarial Example Generation
Adversarial examples are typically generated by performing gradient descent with respect
to the input on a loss function designed to be minimized when the input is adversarial [63].
Specifically, let x be an input to a neural network f (·), let δ be a perturbation, and let `( f (x),y)
be a loss function that is minimized when f (x) = y. Most work on adversarial examples focuses
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on minimizing the max-norm (‖·‖∞ norm) of δ . Then, the typical adversarial example generation
algorithm [63, 10, 41] solves
minimize `( f (x+δ ),y)+α · ‖δ‖
such that ‖δ‖< ε
(where in some formulations α = 0). Here, ε controls the maximum perturbation
introduced.
To generate adversarial examples on ASR systems, [11] set ` to the CTC-loss and use the
max-norm which has the effect of adding a small amount of adversarial perturbation consistently
throughout the audio sample.
5.4 Imperceptible Adversarial Examples
Unlike on images, where minimizing `p distortion between an image and the nearest
misclassified example yields a visually indistinguishable image, on audio, this is not the case [57].
Thus, in this work, we depart from the `p distortion measures and instead rely on the extensive
work which has been done in the audio space for capturing the human perceptibility of audio.
5.4.1 Psychoacoustic Models
A good understanding of the human auditory system is critical in order to be able to
construct imperceptible adversarial examples. In this chapter, we use frequency masking, which
refers to the phenomenon that a louder signal (the “masker”) can make other signals at nearby
frequencies (the “maskees”) imperceptible [45, 39]. In simple terms, the masker can be seen
as creating a “masking threshold” in the frequency domain. Any signals which fall under this
threshold are effectively imperceptible.
Because the masking threshold is measured in the frequency domain, and because audio
signals change rapidly over time, we first compute the short-time Fourier transform of the raw
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audio signal to obtain the spectrum of overlapping sections (called “windows”) of a signal. The
window size N is 2048 samples which are extracted with a “hop size” of 512 samples and are
windowed with the modified Hann window. We denote sx(k) as the kth bin of the spectrum of
frame x.
Then, we compute the log-magnitude power spectral density (PSD) as follows:
px(k) = 10log10
∣∣∣∣ 1N sx(k)
∣∣∣∣2 . (5.1)
The normalized PSD estimate p¯x(k) is defined by [39]
p¯x(k) = 96−max
k
{px(k)}+ px(k) (5.2)
5.4.2 Masking Threshold
In this section, we detail how we compute the frequency masking threshold for construct-
ing imperceptible adversarial examples. This procedure is based on psychoacoustic principles
which were refined over many years of human studies. For further background on psychoacoustic
models, we refer the interested reader to [39, 45].
Given an audio input, in order to compute its masking threshold, first we need to identify
the maskers, whose normalized PSD estimate p¯x(k) must satisfy three criteria: 1) they must be
local maxima in the spectrum; 2) they must be higher than the threshold in quiet; and 3) they
have the largest amplitude within 0.5 Bark (a psychoacoustically-motivated frequency scale)
around the masker’s frequency. Then, each masker’s masking threshold can be approximated
using the simple two-slope spread function, which is derived to mimic the excitation patterns of
maskers. Finally, the global masking threshold θx(k) is a combination of the individual masking
threshold as well as the threshold in quiet via addition (because the effect of masking is additive
in the logarithmic domain).
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• Step 1: Identifications of Maskers
In order to compute the frequency masking threshold of an input signal x(n), where
0 ≤ n ≤ N, we need to first identify the maskers. There are two different classes of
maskers: tonal and nontonal maskers, where nontonal maskers have stronger masking
effects compared to tonal maskers. Here we simply treat all the maskers as tonal ones to
make sure the threshold that we compute can always mask out the noise. The normalized
PSD estimate of the tonal maskers p¯mx (k) must meet three criteria. First, they must be local
maxima in the spectrum, satisfying:
p¯x(k−1)≤ p¯mx (k)≤ p¯x(k+1), (5.3)
where 0≤ k < N2 .
Second, the normalized PSD estimate of any masker must be higher than the threshold in
quiet ATH(k), which is:
p¯mx (k)≥ ATH(k), (5.4)
where ATH(k) is approximated by the following frequency-dependency function:
ATH( f ) = 3.64(
f
1000
)−0.8−6.5exp{−0.6( f
1000
−3.3)2}+10−3( f
1000
)4. (5.5)
The quiet threshold only applies to the human hearing range of 20Hz≤ f ≤ 20kHz. When
we perform short time Fourier transform (STFT) to a signal, the relation between the
frequency f and the index of sampling points k is
f =
k
N
· fs, 0≤ f < fs2 (5.6)
where fs is the sampling frequency and N is the window size.
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Last, the maskers must have the highest PSD within the range of 0.5 Bark around the
masker’s frequency. Human’s main hearing range between 20Hz and 16kHz is divided into
24 non-overlapping critical bands, whose unit is Bark, varying as a function of frequency
f as follows:
b( f ) = 13arctan(
0.76 f
1000
)+3.5arctan(
f
7500
)2. (5.7)
As the effect of masking is additive in the logarithmic domain, the PSD estimate of the
masker is further smoothed with its neighbors by:
p¯mx (k¯) = 10log10[10
p¯x(k−1)
10 +10
p¯mx (k)
10 +10
p¯x(k+1)
10 ] (5.8)
• Step 2: Individual masking thresholds
An individual masking threshold is better computed with frequency denoted at the Bark
scale because the spreading functions of the masker would be similar at different Barks.
We use b(i) to represent the Bark scale of the frequency index i. There are a number
of spreading functions introduced to imitate the characteristics of maskers and here we
choose the simple two-slope spread function:
SF[b(i),b( j)] =

27[b( j)−b(i)], if [b( j)−b(i)]≤ 0.
G(b(i)) · [b( j)−b(i)], otherwise
(5.9)
where G(b(i)) = [−27+0.37max{ p¯mx (b(i))−40,0}] and b(i) and b( j) are the Bark scale
of the masker at the frequency index i and the maskee at frequency index j respectively.
Then, T [b(i),b( j)] refers to the masker at Bark index b(i) contributing to the masking effect
on the maskee at Bark index b( j). Empirically, the threshold T [b(i),b( j)] is calculated by:
T [b(i),b( j)] = p¯mx (b(i))+∆m[b(i)]+SF[b(i),b( j)], (5.10)
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where ∆m[b(i)] =−6.025−0.275b(i) and SF[b(i),b( j)] is the spreading function.
• Step 3: Global masking threshold
The global masking threshold is a combination of individual masking thresholds as well
as the threshold in quiet via addition. The global masking threshold at frequency index i
measured with Decibels (dB) is calculated according to:
θx(i) = 10log10[10
AT H(i)
10 +
Nm
∑
j
10
T [b( j),b[i]]
10 ], (5.11)
where Nm is the set of all the selected maskers. The computed θx is used as the frequency
masking threshold for the input audio x to construct imperceptible adversarial examples.
When we add the perturbation δ to the audio input x, if the normalized PSD estimate of
the perturbation p¯δ (k) is under the frequency masking threshold of the original audio θx(k), the
perturbation will be masked out by the raw audio and therefore be inaudible to humans. The
normalized PSD estimate of the perturbation p¯δ (k) can be calculated via:
p¯δ (k) = 96−max
k
{px(k)}+ pδ (k). (5.12)
where pδ (k) = 10log10 | 1N sδ (k)|2 and px(k) = 10log10 | 1N sx(k)|2 are the PSD estimate of the
perturbation and the original audio input.
5.4.3 Optimization with Masking Threshold
• Loss function
Given an audio example x and a target phrase y, we formulate the problem of constructing
an imperceptible adversarial example x′ = x+δ as minimizing the loss function `(x,δ ,y),
which is defined as:
`(x,δ ,y) = `net( f (x+δ ),y)+α · `θ (x,δ ) (5.13)
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where `net requires that the adversarial examples fool the audio recognition system into
making a targeted prediction y, where f (x) 6= y. In the Lingvo model, the simple cross
entropy loss function is used for `net . The term `θ constrains the normalized PSD estima-
tion of the perturbation p¯δ (k) to be under the frequency masking threshold of the original
audio θx(k). The hinge loss is used here to compute the loss for masking threshold:
`θ (x,δ ) =
1
bN2 c+1
bN2 c
∑
k=0
max
{
p¯δ (k)−θx(k),0
}
, (5.14)
where N is the predefined window size and bxc outputs the greatest integer no larger than
x. The adaptive parameter α is to balance the relative importance of these two criteria.
• Stability
The existence of the log function in the threshold θx(k) and the normalized PSD estimate
of the perturbation p¯δ (k) leads to instability during back-propagation. Therefore, we
remove the term 10log10 in the PSD estimate of pδ (k) and px(k) and then they become:
pδ (k) =
∣∣∣∣ 1N sδ (k)
∣∣∣∣2 , px(k) = ∣∣∣∣ 1N sx(k)
∣∣∣∣2 (5.15)
and the normalized PSD of the perturbation turns into
p¯δ (k) =
109.6 pδ (k)
maxk{px(k)} . (5.16)
Correspondingly, the threshold θx(k) becomes:
θx(k) = 10
θx
10 (5.17)
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• Two Stage Attack
Empirically, we find it is difficult to directly minimize the masking threshold loss function
via backpropagation without any constraint on the magnitude of the perturbation δ . This is
reasonable because it is very challenging to fool the neural network and limit a very large
perturbation to be under the masking threshold in the frequency domain at the same time.
In contrast, if the perturbation δ is relatively small in magnitude, then it will be much
easier to push the remaining distortion under the frequency masking threshold.
Therefore, we divide the optimization into two stages: the first stage of optimization
focuses on finding a relatively small perturbation to fool the network (as was done in prior
work [11]) and the second stage makes the adversarial examples imperceptible.
In the first stage, we set α in Eqn 5.13 to be zero and clip the perturbation to be within a
relatively small range. As a result, the first stage solves:
minimize `net( f (x+δ ),y)
such that ‖δ‖< ε
(5.18)
where ‖δ‖ represents the ‖·‖∞ max-norm of δ . Specifically, we begin by setting δ = 0
and then on each iteration:
δ ← clipε(δ − lr1 · sign(∇δ `net( f (x+δ ),y))), (5.19)
where lr1 is the learning rate and and ∇δ `net is the gradient of `net with respect to δ . We
initially set ε to a large value and then gradually reduced during optimization follow-
ing [11].
The second stage focuses making the adversarial examples imperceptible, with an un-
bounded max-norm; instead, δ is only constrained by the masking threshold constraints.
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Specifically, initialize δ with δ ∗im optimized in the first stage and then on each iteration:
δ ← δ − lr2 ·∇δ `(x,δ ,y), (5.20)
where lr2 is the learning rate and ∇δ ` is the gradient of ` with respect to δ . The loss
function `(x,δ ,y) is defined in Eqn. 5.13. The parameter α that balances the network loss
`net( f (x+δ ),y) and the imperceptibility loss `θ (x,y) is initialized with a small value, e.g.,
0.05, and is adaptively updated according to the performance of the attack. Specifically,
every twenty iterations, if the current adversarial example successfully fools the ASR
system (i.e. f (x+δ ) = y), then α is increased to attempt to make the adversarial example
less perceptible. Correspondingly, every fifty iterations, if the current adversarial example
fails to make the targeted prediction, we decrease α . We check for attack failure less
frequently than success (fifty vs. twenty iterations) to allow more iterations for the network
to converge.
5.4.4 Implementation Details
In order to construct imperceptible adversarial examples, we divide the optimization into
two stages. In the first stage, the learning rate lr1 is set to be 100 and the number of iterations T1
is 1000 as [11]. The max-norm bound ε starts from 2000 and will be gradually reduced during
optimization. In the second stage, the number of iterations T2 is 4000. The learning rate lr2 starts
from 1 and will be reduced to be 0.1 after 3000 iterations. The adaptive parameter α which
balances the importance between `net and `θ begins with 0.05 and gradually updated based on the
performance of adversarial examples. Adam optimizer [31] is used to construct the imperceptible
adversarial examples. Algorithm ?? shows the details of the two-stage optimization.
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5.5 Robust Adversarial Examples
5.5.1 Acoustic Room Simulator
In order to improve the robustness of adversarial examples when playing over-the-air,
we use an acoustic room simulator to create artificial utterances (speech with reverberations)
that mimic playing the audio over-the-air. The transformation function in the acoustic room
simulator, denoted as t, takes the clean audio x as an input and outputs the simulated speech
with reverberation t(x). First, the room simulator applies the classic Image Source Method
introduced in [1, 56] to create the room impulse response r based on the room configurations
(the room dimension, source audio and target microphone’s location, and reverberation time).
Then, the generated room impulse response r is convolved with the clean audio to create the
speech with reverberation, to obtain t(x) = x∗ r where ∗ denotes the convolution operation. To
make the generated adversarial examples robust to various environments, multiple room impulse
responses r are used. Therefore, the transformation function t follows a chosen distribution T
over different room configurations.
5.5.2 Optimization with Reverberations
In this section, our objective is to make the perturbed speech with reverberation (rather
than the clean audio) fool the ASR system. As a result, the generated adversarial examples
x′ = x+δ will be passed through the room simulator first to create the simulated speech with
reverberation t(x′), mimicking playing the adversarial examples over-the-air, and then the
simulated t(x′) will be fed as the new input to fool the ASR system, aiming at f (t(x′)) = y.
Simultaneously, the adversarial perturbation δ should be relatively small in order not to be
audible to humans.
In the same manner as the Expectation over Transformation in [3], we optimize the
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expectation of the loss function over different transformations t ∼T as follows:
minimize `(x,δ ,y) = E
t∼T
[
`net( f (t(x+δ )),y)
]
such that ‖δ‖< ε.
(5.21)
Rather than directly targeting f (x+δ ) = y, we apply the loss function lnet (the cross entropy
loss in the Lingvo network) to the classification of the transformed speech f (t(x+δ )) = y. We
approximate the gradient of the expected value via independently sampling a transformation t
from the distribution T at each gradient descent step.
In the first Ir1 iterations, we initialize ε with a sufficiently large value and gradually
reduce it following [11]. We consider the adversarial example successful if it successfully fools
the ASR system under a single random room configuration; that is, if f (t(x+δ )) = y for just
one t(·). Once this optimization is complete, we obtain the max-norm bound for δ , denoted as
ε∗r . We will then use the perturbation δ ∗r as an initialization for δ in the next stage.
Then in the following Ir2 iterations, we finetune the perturbation δ with a much smaller
learning rate. The max-norm bound ε is increased to ε∗∗r = ε∗r +∆, where ∆> 0, and held constant
during optimization. During this phase, we only consider the attack successful if the adversarial
example successfully fools a set of randomly chosen transformations Ω= {t1, t2, · · · , tM}, where
ti ∼T and M is the size of the set Ω. The transformation set Ω is randomly sampled from the
distribution T at each gradient descent step. In other words, the adversarial example x′ = x+δ
generated in this stage satisfies ∀ti ∈ Ω, f (ti(x+δ )) = y. In this way, we can generate robust
adversarial examples that successfully attack ASR systems when the exact room environment is
not known ahead of time, whose configuration is drawn from a pre-defined distribution.
It should be emphasized that there is a tradeoff between imperceptibility and robustness
(as we will show experimentally in Section 5.7.2). If we increase the max amplitude of the
perturbation ε∗∗r , the robustness can always be further improved. Correspondingly, it becomes
much easier for humans to perceive the adversarial perturbation and alert the ASR system.
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In order to keep these adversarial examples mostly imperceptible, we therefore limit the `∞
amplitude of the perturbation to be in a reasonable range.
• Implementation Details
To develop the robust adversarial examples that could work after being played over-the-air,
we also optimize the adversarial perturbation in two stages. The first stage intends to find
a relatively small perturbation while the second stage focuses on making the constructed
adversarial example more robust to random room configurations. The learning rate lr1 in
the first stage is 50 and δ will be updated for 2000 iterations. The max-norm bound ε for
the adversarial perturbation δ starts from 2000 as well and will be gradually reduced. In
the second stage, the number of iterations is set to be 4000 and the learning rate lr2 is 5. In
this stage, ε is fixed and equals the optimized ε∗r in the first stage plus ∆. The size of the
transformation set Ω is set to be M = 10.
5.6 Imperceptible and Robust Attacks
By combining both of the techniques we developed earlier, we now develop an approach
to generate both imperceptible and robust adversarial examples. This can be achieved by
minimizing the loss
`(x,δ ,y) = E
t∼T
[
`net( f (t(x+δ )),y)+α · `θ (x,δ )
]
, (5.22)
where the cross entropy loss function `net(·) is again the loss used for Lingvo, and the impercep-
tibility loss `θ (·) is the same as that defined in Eqn 5.14. Since we need to fool the ASR system
when the speech is played after random perturbations, the cross entropy loss `net( f (t(x+δ )),y)
forces the transcription of the transformed adversarial example t(x+δ ) to be y (again, as done
earlier).
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To further improve these adversarial examples to be imperceptible, we optimize `θ (x,δ )
to constrain the perturbation δ to fall under the masking threshold of the clean audio in the
frequency domain. This is much easier compared to optimizing the hinge loss `θ (t(x), t(δ )) =
max{p¯t(δ )(k)−θt(x)(k),0} because the frequency masking threshold of the clean audio θx(k)
can be pre-computed while the masking threshold of the speech with reverberation θt(x)(k)
varies with the room reverberation r. In addition, optimizing `θ (x,δ ) and `θ (t(x), t(δ )) have
similar effects based on the convolution theorem that the Fourier transform of a convolution
of two signals is the pointwise product of their Fourier transforms. Note that the speech with
reverberation t(x) is a convolution of the clean audio x and a simulated room reverberation r,
hence:
F{t(x)}=F{x∗ r}=F{x} ·F{r} (5.23)
where F is the Fourier transform, ∗ denotes the convolution operation and · represents the
pointwise product. We apply the short-time Fourier transform to the perturbation and the raw
audio signal first in order to compute the power spectral density p¯t(δ ) and the masking threshold
θt(x) in the frequency domain. Since most of the energy in the room impulse response falls
within the spectral analysis window size, the convolution theorem in Eqn 5.23 is approximately
satisfied. Therefore, we arrive at:
(p¯t(δ )−θt(x))≈ (p¯δ −θx) ·F{r}. (5.24)
As a result, optimizing the imperceptibility loss `θ (x,δ ) can help in finding the optimal
δ and in constructing the imperceptible adversarial examples that can attack the ASR systems in
the physical world.
Specifically, we will first initialize δ with the perturbation δ ∗∗r that enables the adversarial
examples to be robust in Section 5.5. Then in each iteration, we randomly sample a transformation
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t from the distribution T and update δ according to:
δ ← δ − lr3 ·∇δ
[
`net( f (t(x+δ ),y))+α · `θ (x,δ ))
]
, (5.25)
where lr3 is the learning rate and α , a parameter that balances the importance of the robust-
ness and the imperceptibility, is adaptively changed based on the performance of adversarial
examples. Specifically, if the constructed adversarial example can successfully attack a set of
randomly chosen transformations, then α will be increased to focus more on imperceptibility
loss. Otherwise, α is decreased to make the attack more robust to multiple room environments.
• Implementation Details
To construct imperceptible and robust adversarial examples, we begin with the robust
adversarial examples generated in Section. 5.5. In the first stage, we focus on reducing
the imperceptibility by setting the initial α to be 0.01 and the learning rate is set to be 1.
We update the adversarial perturbation δ for 4000 iterations. If the adversarial example
successfully attacks the ASR system in 4 out of 10 randomly chosen rooms, then α will
be increased by 2. Otherwise, for every 50 iterations, α will be decreased by 0.5.
In the second stage, we focus on improving the less perceptible adversarial examples to
be more robust. The learning rate is 1.5 and α starts from a very small value of 0.00005.
The perturbation will be further updated for 6000 iterations. If the adversarial example
successfully attacks the ASR system in 8 out of 10 randomly chosen rooms, then α will
be increased by 1.2.
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Table 5.1. Examples of the original and targeted phrases on the LibriSpeech dataset.
Original phrase 1 the more she is engaged in her proper duties the less leisure will she
have for it even as an accomplishment and a recreation
Targeted phrase 1 old will is a fine fellow but poor and helpless since missus rogers had
her accident
Original phrase 2 a little cracked that in the popular phrase was my impression of the
stranger who now made his appearance in the supper room
Targeted phrase 2 her regard shifted to the green stalks and leaves again and she started
to move away
5.7 Evaluation
5.7.1 Datasets and Evaluation Metrics
• Datasets
We use the LibriSpeech dataset [48] in our experiments, which is a corpus of 16KHz
English speech derived from audiobooks and is used to train the Lingvo system [59]. We
randomly select 1000 audio examples as source examples, and 1000 separate transcriptions
from the test-clean dataset to be the targeted transcriptions. We ensure that each target
transcription is around the same length as the original transcription because it is unrealistic
and overly challenging to perturb a short audio clip (e.g., 10 words) to have a much longer
transcription (e.g., 20 words). Examples of the original and targeted transcriptions are
available in Table 5.1.
• Evaluation Metrics
For automatic speech recognition, we evaluate our model using the standard word error
rate (WER) metric, which is defined as WER = S+D+INW ×100%, where S, D and I are the
number of substitutions, deletions and insertions of words respectively, and NW is the total
number of words in the reference.
We also calculate the success rate (sentence-level accuracy) as Accuracy = NsNa ×100%,
where Na is the number of audio examples that we test, and Ns is the number of audio
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Table 5.2. Sentence-level accuracy and WER for 1000 clean and (imperceptible) adversarially
perturbed examples, fed without over-the-air simulation into the Lingvo model. In “Clean”,
the ground truth is the original transcription. In“Adversarial”, the ground truth is the targeted
transcription.
Input Clean Adversarial
Accuracy (%) 58.60 100.00
WER (%) 4.47 0.00
examples that are correctly transcribed. Here, “correctly transcribed” means the original
transcription for clean audio and the targeted transcription for adversarial examples.
5.7.2 Imperceptibility Analysis
To attack the Lingvo ASR system, we construct 1000 imperceptible and targeted adversar-
ial examples, one for each of the examples we sampled from the LibriSpeech test-clean dataset.
Table5.2 shows the performance of the clean audio and the constructed adversarial examples. We
can see that the word error rate (WER) of the clean audio is just 4.47% on the 1000 test examples,
indicating the model is of high quality. Our imperceptible adversarial examples perform even
better, and reach a 100% success rate.
Qualitative Human Study
Of the 1000 examples selected from the test set, we randomly selected 100 of these with
their corresponding imperceptible adversarial example. We generate then generate an adversarial
example using the prior work of [11] for the same target phrase; this attack again succeeds
with 100% success. We perform three experiments to validate that our adversarial examples are
imperceptible, especially compared to prior work.
• Experimental Design.
We recruit 80 users online from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We give each user one of the
three (nearly identical) experiments, each of which we describe below. In all cases, the
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experiments consist of 20 “comparisons tasks”, where we present the evaluator with some
audio samples and ask them questions (described below) about the samples. We ask the
user to listen to each sample with headphones on, and answer a simple question about the
audio samples (the question is determined by which experiment we run, as given below).
We do not explain the purpose of the study other than that it is a research study, and do not
record any personally identifying information.2 We randomly include a small number of
questions with known, obvious answers; we remove 3 users from the study who failed to
answer these questions correctly.
In all experiments, users have the ability to listen to audio files multiple times when they
are unsure of the answer, making it as difficult as possible for our adversarial examples to
pass as clean data. Users additionally have the added benefit of hearing 20 examples back-
to-back, effectively “training” them to recognize subtle differences. Indeed, a permutation
test finds users are statistically significantly better at distinguishing adversarial examples
from clean audio during the second half of the experiment compared to the first half of the
experiment, although the magnitude of the difference is small: only by about 3%.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the statistical results we give below.
• Experiment 1: clean or noisy.
We begin with what we believe is the most representative experiment of how an attack
would work in practice. We give users one audio sample and ask them to tell us if it has
any background noise (e.g., static, echoing, people talking in the background).
As a baseline, users believed that 19% of original clean audio samples contained some
amount of noise, and 66% of users believed that the adversarial examples generated by
[11] contained some amount of noise. In comparison, only 23% of users believe that
the adversarial examples we generate contain any noise, a result that is not statistically
2Unfortunately, for this reason, we are unable to report aggregate statistics such as age or gender, slightly
harming potential reproducibility.
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significantly different from clean audio (p> .05). That is, when presented with just one
audio sample in isolation, users do not believe the adversarial examples we generate are
any noisier than the clean samples.
• Experiment 2: identify the original.
We give users two audio samples and inform them that one of the audio samples is a
modified version of the other; we ask the user to select the audio sample corresponding
to the one which sounds like the more natural audio sample. This setup is much more
challenging: when users can listen to both the before and after, it is often possible to pick
up on the small amount of distortion that has been added. When comparing the original
audio to the adversarial examples generated by [11], the evaluator chose the original audio
82% of the time. When we have the evaluator compare the imperceptible adversarial
examples we generate to those of [11], our imperceptible examples are selected as the
better audio sample 83% of the time—a difference that is not statistically distinguishable
from comparing against the clean audio.
However, when directly comparing the adversarial examples we generate to the clean audio,
users prefer the clean audio still 66% of the time. Observe that the baseline percentage,
when the samples are completely indistinguishable, is 50%. Thus, users only perform 16%
better than random guessing at distinguishing our examples from clean examples.
• Experiment 3: identical or not.
Finally, we perform the most difficult experiment: we present users with two audio files,
and ask them if the audio samples are identical, or if there are any differences. As the
baseline, when given the same audio sample twice, users agreed it was identical 85% of
the time. (That is, in 15% of cases the evaluator wrongly heard a difference between the
two samples.) When given a clean audio sample and comparing it to the audio generated
by [11], users only believed them to be identical 24% of the time. Comparing clean audio
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to the adversarial examples we generate, user believed them to be completely identical
76% of the time, 3× more often than the adversarial examples generated by the baseline,
but below the 85%-identical value for actually-identical audio.
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Figure 5.1. Results of human study for imperceptibility. Here baseline represents the adversarial
example generated by [11], and ours denotes the imperceptible adversarial example generated
following the algorithm in Section. 5.4.
5.7.3 Robustness Analysis
To mount our simulated over-the-air attacks, we consider a challenging setting that the
exact configuration of the room in which the attack will be performed is unknown. Instead, we
are only aware of the distribution from which the room configuration will be drawn. First, we
generate 1000 random room configurations sampled from the distribution as the training room
set. The test room set includes another 100 random room configurations sampled from the same
distribution. Adversarial examples are created to attack the Lingvo ASR system when played in
the simulated test rooms. We randomly choose 100 audio examples from LibriSpeech dataset to
perform this robustness test.
As shown in Table 5.3, when fed non-adversarial audio played in simulated test rooms, the
WER of the Lingvo ASR degrades to 15.42% which suggests some robustness to reverberation.
In contrast, the success rate of adversarial examples in [11] and our imperceptible adversarial
examples in Section 5.4 are 0% in this setting. The success rate of our robust adversarial
examples generated based on the algorithm in Section 5.5 is over 60%, and the WER is smaller
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Table 5.3. Sentence-level accuracy and WER for 100 clean and adversarially perturbed examples,
fed with over-the-air simulation into the Lingvo model. The ground truth for “clean” inputs is
the original transcription while the ground truth is the targeted transcription for the adversarial
inputs. The perturbation is bounded by ‖δ‖< ε∗r +∆.
Input Clean
Robust
(∆= 300)
Robust
(∆= 400)
Imperceptible
& Robust
Accuracy (%) 31.37 62.96 64.64 49.65
WER (%) 15.42 14.45 13.83 22.98
than that of the clean audio. Both the success rate and the WER demonstrate that our constructed
adversarial examples remain effective when played in the highly-realistic simulated environment.
In addition, the robustness of the constructed adversarial examples can be improved
further at the cost of increased perceptibility. As presented in Table 5.3, when we increase the
max-norm bound of the amplitude of the adversarial perturbation ε∗∗r = ε∗r +∆ (∆ is increased
from 300 to 400), both the success rate and WER are improved correspondingly. Since our
final objective is to generate imperceptible and robust adversarial examples that can be played
over-the-air in the physical world, we limit the max-norm bound of the perturbation to be in a
relatively small range to avoid a huge distortion toward the clean audio.
To construct imperceptible as well as robust adversarial examples, we start from the
robust attack (∆= 300) and finetune it with the imperceptibility loss. In our experiments, we
observe that 81% of the robust adversarial examples 3 can be further improved to be much less
perceptible while still retaining high robustness (around 50% success rate and 22.98% WER).
Qualitative Human Study
We run identical experiments (as described earlier) on the robust and robust & impercep-
tible adversarial examples.
In experiment 1, where we ask evaluators if there is any noise, only 6% heard any noise
3The other 19% adversarial examples lose the robustness because they cannot successfully attack the ASR
system in 8 randomly chosen training rooms in any iteration during optimization.
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on the clean audio, compared to 100% on the robust (but perceptible) adversarial examples and
83% on the robust and imperceptible adversarial examples. 4
In experiment 2, where we ask evaluators to identify the original audio, comparing clean
to robust adversarial examples the evaluator correctly identified the original audio 97% of the
time versus 89% when comparing the clean audio to the imperceptible and robust adversarial
examples.
Finally, in experiment 3, where we ask evaluators if the audio is identical, the baseline
clean audio was judged different 95% of the time when compared to the robust adversarial
examples, and the clean audio was judged different 71% of the time when compared to the
imperceptible and robust adversarial examples.
In all cases, the imperceptible and robust adversarial examples are statistically signifi-
cantly less perceptible than just the robust adversarial examples, but also statistically significantly
more perceptible than the clean audio. Directly comparing the imperceptible and robust adver-
sarial examples to the robust examples, evaluators believed the imperceptible examples had less
distortion 91% of the time.
Clearly the adversarial examples that are robust are significantly easier to distinguish
from clean audio, even when we apply the masking threshold. However, this result is consistent
with work on adversarial examples on images, where completely imperceptible physical-world
adversarial examples have not been successfully constructed. On images, physical attacks require
over 16× as much distortion to be effective on the physical world (see, for example, Figure 4 of
[33]).
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we successfully construct imperceptible adversarial examples (verified
by a human study) for automatic speech recognition based on the psychoacoustic principle
4Evaluators stated they heard noise on clean examples 3× less often compared to the baseline in the prior study.
We believe this is due to the fact that when primed with examples which are obviously different, the baseline
becomes more easily distinguishable.
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of auditory masking, while retaining 100% targeted success rate on arbitrary full-sentence
targets. Simultaneously, we also make progress towards developing robust adversarial examples
that remain effective after being played over-the-air (processed by random room environment
simulators), increasing the practicality of actual real-world attacks using adversarial examples
targeting ASR systems.
We believe that future work is still required: our robust adversarial examples do not play
fully over-the-air, despite working in simulated room environments. Resolving this difficulty
while maintaining a high targeted success rate is necessary for demonstrating a practical security
concern.
As a final contribution of potentially independent interest, this work demonstrates how
one might go about constructing adversarial examples for non-`p-based metrics. Especially
on images, nearly all adversarial example research has focused on this highly-limited distance
measure. Devoting effort to identifying different methods that humans use to assess similarity,
and generating adversarial examples exploiting those metrics, is an important research effort we
hope future work will explore.
This chapter is based on the material as it appears in the Proceedings of the International
Conference on Machine Learning (ICML19) (Yao Qin, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow,
Garrison Cottrell and Colin Raffel, “Imperceptible, Robust and Targeted Adversarial Examples
for Automatic Speech Recognition”). The dissertation author was the primary investigator and
author of this paper.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we mainly focused on adversarial defenses in the image domain and ad-
versarial attacks in the audio domain. In the image domain, we proposed a class-conditional
reconstruction-based detection method that does not rely on a specific predefined adversarial at-
tack. To specifically attack the detection method, we design a new defense-aware attack in which
the adversary not only optimizes the classification loss but also takes the reconstruction error
into consideration. We have shown that our detection method together with a Capsule network
can detect standard and defense-aware attacks very well. To further diagnose the adversarial
examples against Capsule networks and convolutional based networks, we qualitatively showed
that the success of the reconstructive attack was proportional to the visual similarity between the
target class and the source class for the CapsNet, which is not the case for convolutional based
networks. This indicates that the Capsule model relies on visual features similar to those used
by humans and has the potential to help us have a better understanding of how neural networks
work.
In addition, we propose a deflecting model which presents a new notion of deflecting
adversarial examples, which is a step towards ending the cycle between stronger defenses and
attacks in the adversarial game. To deflect adversarial examples is to pressure the attacker to
make the adversarial input resemble the target class and therefore, the adversarial input stops
being adversarial. The existence of deflected adversarial examples shows that the most commonly
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used `p norm constraint to the adversarial perturbation does not ensure imperceptibility because
the deflected adversarial examples are within a standard small `p norm distance to the original
image but are classified by humans as a different class.
In the audio domain, we successfully construct imperceptible adversarial examples
(verified by a human study) for automatic speech recognition based on the psychoacoustic
principle of auditory masking, while retaining a 100% targeted success rate on arbitrary full-
sentence targets. Simultaneously, we also make progress towards developing robust adversarial
examples that remain effective after being played over-the-air (processed by random room
environment simulators), increasing the practicality of actual real-world attacks using adversarial
examples targeting ASR systems.
We believe that future work on adversarial examples is still required and below we mainly
discuss three promosing directions:
• Generalization
Most existing research work on adversarial examples has focused on the image domain.
The properties of image adversaial examples have not yet been tested to hold true in other
domains, e.g., audio or text domains. For example, transferability, a fact that frequently
adversarial examples designed for one network will work against another network, is a
property that significantly complicates finding robust defenses [49]. This should be further
studied to see if it can be successfully generalized to other domains. In addition, we must
seek methods that can combine domain-specific knowledge and the lessons learned from
image adversarial examples. For instance, when the input is discrete (text domain) rather
than continuous (image and audio domain), how to define, design and defend against
adversarial examples?
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• Robustness
Designing more robust adversarial examples and more robust defense models is critical for
real-world applications. For example, our imperceptible adversarial examples do not work
while playing over-the-air. To construct robust adversarial examples, we can incorporate
the real room impulses, e.g., the BUT dataset [65], to help create adversarial examples that
remain effective while playing over-the-air. Resolving this difficulty while maintaining
a high target success rate is necessary for demonstrating a practical security concern. In
addition, our detection mechanism relies on a similarity metric (`2 reconstruction error)
between the reconstruction and the input. This metric is required both during training in
order to train the reconstruction network and during test time in order to flag adversarial
examples. In the datasets we have evaluated, the distance between examples roughly
correlates with semantic similarity. This is not the case, however, for images in more
complex datasets such as ImageNet [15], in which two images may be similar in terms of
semantic content but nevertheless have significant `2 distance. This issue will need to be
resolved for this method to scale up to more complex and practical datasets.
• Understanding
In this work, we have shown that Capsule networks rely on features that are more aligned
to human perception compared to convolutional based networks. Devoting efforts to study
the adversarial examples against these two different network architectures and find out the
underlying explanation for the superior performance is an interesting future direction. We
believe that it could also help us have a better understanding of how neural networks work.
In addition, the deflected adversarial examples have the potential to fall into the same
distribution as the clean data. Therefore, constructing a dataset of deflected adversarial
examples is an interesting direction that we hope future work could explore to see if it can
serve as a data augmentation method and benefit few-shot learning tasks.
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